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Abstract. We present a substructural epistemic logic, based on Boolean BI, in
which the epistemic modalities are parametrized on agents’ local resources. The
new modalities can be seen as generalizations of the usual epistemic modalities.
The logic combines Boolean BI’s resource semantics — we introduce BI and its
resource semantics at some length — with epistemic agency. We illustrate the
use of the logic in systems modelling by discussing some examples about access
control, including semaphores, using resource tokens. We also give a labelled
tableaux calculus and establish soundness and completeness with respect to the
resource semantics.
1 Introduction
The concept of resource is important in many fields including, among others, computer
science, economics, and security. For example, in operating systems, processes access
system resources such as memory, files, processor time, and bandwidth, with correct
resource usage being essential for the robust function of the system. The internet can
be regarded as a giant, dynamic net of resources, in which Uniform Resource Locators
refer to located data and code.
In recent years, the concept of resource has been studied and analysed in computer
science through the bunched logic, BI, [21,30,36] and its variants, such as Boolean
BI (BBI) [25] and bunched modal logics [13,15], and applications, such as Separation
Logic [25,37].
The truth-functional, Kripke semantics of these logics, based on preordered partial
monoids is sketched below. However, before proceeding to describe this semantics, it is
perhaps worth observing that this choice of structure for BI’s models can be motivated
directly in terms of natural requirements for the properties of a notion of resource.
Assuming a set of resource elements, we expect to be able to
- combine two resource elements to give a new resource element, and
- to be able to compare two resource elements, to determine which is the greater.
It is also natural to expect that the combination of elements be partial and this is indeed
amply justified by leading examples. These simple assumptions, that around are cleanly
captured by preordered partial monoids, have led to a remarkably useful ‘resource se-
mantics’. The need for partiality arises in two ways. Conceptually, we observe that
in our semantics of resources it is quite natural to expect that not all combinations of
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resource elements will exist (Separation Logic [25,37] provides an immediate and com-
pelling example). Second, partiality is technically convenient for BI’s metatheory [21].
These considerations lead to a semantics for BI based on partially ordered partial
monoids of worlds,
R = (R,v,•,e).
Here, composition of resources is captured by the partial monoidal operation, •, with
unit e, and comparison of resources is captured by the partial order v. Where defined,
this structure is required to satisfy the bifunctoriality condition that if r1 v s1 and r2 v
s2, then r1 • r2 v s1 • s2. Let us note that ↓ denotes definedness of the composition.
Given such structures, the logic BI of bunched implications — see, for example,
[21,30,34,36] — which freely combines intuitionistic propositional additives with intu-
itionistic propositional multiplicatives — has its Kripke semantics given by the follow-
ing satisfaction relation, where V is an interpretation of propositional letters in℘(R), in
the usual way:
r |= p iff r ∈V (p)
r |=⊥ never
r |=> always
r |= ¬φ iff r 6|= φ
r |= φ∨ψ iff r |= φ or r |= ψ
r |= φ∧ψ iff r |= φ and r |= ψ
r |= φ→ ψ iff for all r v s,
if s |= φ, then s |= ψ
r |= I iff ev r
r |= φ∗ψ iff there exist r1,r2 ∈ R s.t. r1 • r2 ↓, r v r1 • r2, and
r1 |= φ and r2 |= ψ
r |= φ−∗ψ iff for all r′ ∈ R, if r • r′ ↓ and r′ |= φ,
then r • r′ |= ψ
This resource semantics for BI — that is, the interpretation of BI’s semantics in
terms of resources — underpins its applications to Separation Logic — and its family
of derivatives; see [18,19] for an extensive discussion — and is mainly concerned with
sharing and separation.
Specifically, Separation Logic is usually given as a presentation (often using Hoare
triples) of a specific theory of Boolean BI for a language of memory cells and pointers
with a model based on the stack and the heap [25]. Versions of Separation Logic that
are based on (intuitionistic) BI, as given above, are also possible [25].
In Boolean BI (BBI), [25,37], the additives are classical, so that the order is col-
lapsed to equality in the partial monoid. Thus we have
r |= φ→ ψ iff if r |= φ, then r |= ψ
r |= I iff e = r
r |= φ∗ψ iff there exist r1,r2 ∈ R s.t. r1 • r2 ↓, r = r1 • r2, and
r1 |= φ and r2 |= ψ
The semantics described above is otherwise unchanged.
Thus sharing of resources is captured by additive connectives, such as ∧, while
separation of resources is captured by multiplicative connectives, such as ∗. These con-
nectives are the logical kernels of the family of separation logics, with resources being
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interpreted in various ways, such as memory regions, [25,37], or elements of other par-
ticular monoids of resources [9]. This semantic view of resource stands in stark contrast
to the the ‘number-of-uses’ reading of Linear Logic’s proof theory [23]. We shall return
to this point in the sequel, where we consider the evolution of a model of system of
resources.
This framework of resource semantics has also been extended into modal logic.
Specifically, we can set up a conservative extension (a ‘Logic of Separating Modalities’
or LSM [15]) of the modal logic S4 which adds multiplicative modalities — modali-
ties that are parametrized on (local) resources. These modalities are defined relative to
two-dimensional worlds, one of which captures the S4 accessibility relation and one of
which supports the resource parametrization.
Roughly speaking, an LSM model is a 4-tuple (W,R ,R,V ), where W is a set of
worlds, R is a partial monoid of ‘resources’ (Res,•,e), R⊆ (W ×Res)× (W ×Res) is
a reflexive and transitive relation, and V is an interpretation of propositional letters in
℘(W ×Res). Then, using the both dimensions of ‘worlds’ to handle, respectively, both
classical modality and resource parametrization, we have
w,r |= ♦sφ iff there exist w′ ∈W and r′ ∈ R such that r • s ↓,
(w,r • s)R(w′,r′) and w′,r′ |= φ
w,r |=sφ iff for all w′ ∈W and all r′ ∈ R, if r • s ↓ and
(w,r • s)R(w′,r′), then w′,r′ |= φ.
Here, s is the local resource, associated with the modality, and r, in the model, is the
ambient resource. The modalities are read as asserting that φ is possibly (respectively,
necessarily) true at the world (w,r) subject to the availability of additional resource s.
Note that two other pairs of modalities are derivable from these:
- The basic additive modalities:
w,r |= ♦φ iff there exist w′ ∈W and r′ ∈ R such that (w,r)R(w′,r′)
and w′,r′ |= φ
w,r |=φ iff for all w′ ∈W and all r′ ∈ R, if (w,r)R(w′,r′) then
w′,r′ |= φ.
- Multiplicative modalities with undetermined additional resource parameters:
w,r |= ♦•φ iff there exist w′ ∈W and s,r′ ∈ R such that r • s ↓,
(w,r • s)R(w′,r′), and w′,r′ |=M φ
w,r |=•φ iff for all w′ ∈W and all s,r′ ∈ R, if (r • s ↓ and
(w,r • s)R(w′,r′)) then w′,r′ |= φ.
Full details of the derivations of these modalities may be found in [15] (Lemma 6),
where the conservativity of LSM over S4 is also established (in Section 5). The key
feature of BI as a modelling tool (and hence of its specific model Separation Logic) is
its control of the representation and handling of resources provided by the resource se-
mantics and the associated proof systems. Notice that, in the semantics given above, the
components of the additive conjunction, ∧, share resources whereas the truth condition
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for the multiplicative conjunction, ∗, requires separate resources for each component.
Notice also that this interpretation extends to the multiplicative implication as follows:
−∗ can be seen as (the type of) a function that combines the resource required to support
itself with the resource required to support its argument to give the resource required
to support the application of the function to its argument (see [30,31]). Finally, notice
also that we do not assume (in the manner of hybrid logic) the existence of an atomic
proposition for each element ‘s’ of the set Res with r |= s iff r = s: from the perspec-
tive of resource semantics, such an assumption — the motivations for which would be
somewhat technical and essentially syntactic — is not well supported. In particular, we
would argue that such an assumption obscures the natural structure of the modalities
that we wish to explore and. moreover, imposes a constraint on the relationship be-
tween worlds and their properties that we do not wish to take in general. We will return
to this point briefly in Section 2.
BI’s sequent proof systems employ bunches, with two context-building operations:
one for the additives —characterized by ∧, which admits weakening and contraction —
and one for the multiplicatives — characterized by ∗, which admits neither weakening
nor contraction. Bunches are not finite sequences of formulae, but rather are finite trees,
with formulae at the leaves and the context building operations at the internal vertices.
For the details of the set-up, see [30,31,36].
In this set-up, we have the following right rules for the conjunctions and their cor-
responding implications,→ and −∗:
Γ ` φ ∆ ` ψ
Γ ; ∆ ` φ∧ψ ∧R and
Γ ; φ ` ψ
Γ ` φ→ ψ →R
and
Γ ` φ ∆ ` ψ
Γ , ∆ ` φ∗ψ ∗R and
Γ , φ ` ψ
Γ ` φ−∗ψ −∗R.
Again, details may be found in the references given above.
In this setting, the structural rules of Weakening and Contraction arise as follows:
Γ(φ) ` χ
Γ(φ ; ψ) ` χ W and
Γ(φ ; φ) ` ψ
Γ(φ) ` ψ C.
In the former rule, the leaf φ is replaced by the bunch φ ; ψ and, in the latter rule, the
sub-bunch (in the evident sense) φ ; φ is replaced by the formula φ. In both cases, ;
(rather than , ) is used. Again, details may be found in the references given above.
The soundness and completeness of BI’s proof systems for the semantics given
above is established in [30,36] and elsewhere and via labelled tableaux in [21], and
the completeness of BBI for the partial monoid semantics described above is discussed
comprehensively in [27].
The idea of resource semantics as it derives from BI and its models and its use as
modelling tool is discussed extensively in [35], in an article that is intended to be widely
accessible to logicians and computer scientists.
Girard’s Linear Logic (LL) [23] also decomposes the logical connectives into addi-
tive and multiplicative forms (for classical and intuitionistic conjunction and disjunc-
tion, but not for intuitionistic implication). However, it does so in a very different way
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from BI. Instead of employing bunches to allow control of the structural rules, LL in-
troduces the so-called exponentials ! and ? — modalities, similar to S4’s 2 and 3) —
which have the following left and right rules:
Γ,φ ` ∆
Γ, !φ ` ∆ !L
!Γ ` φ,?∆
!Γ `!φ,?∆ !R
!Γ,φ `?∆
!Γ,?φ `?∆ ?L
Γ ` φ,∆
Γ `?φ,∆ ?R
Then the structural rules of Weakening and Contraction arise as
Γ ` ∆
Γ, !φ ` ∆ WL
Γ ` ∆
Γ `?φ,∆ WR
and
Γ, !φ, !φ ` ∆
Γ, !φ ` ∆ CL
Γ `?φ,?φ,∆
Γ `?φ,∆ CR
Restricting to a single-conclusioned calculus for intuitionistic LL, we have just the ! .
At this point, we may ask what is the relationship between BI and LL. The short
answer is that they are essentially incomparable. This is explained in detail in the ref-
erences given above (e.g., [30,34,35]), but the essential point can be seen in terms of
their differing treatments of intuitionistic implication. In BI, which can be considered to
freely combines intuitionistic propositional logic and multiplicative propositional lin-
ear logic, intuitionistic implication is present directly. In LL, intuitionistic implication,
φ⊃ ψ, is represented using Girard’s translation
φ⊃ ψ = !φ( ψ (1)
Such a representation does not exist in BI. This can be seen, as described in [30,
34,35], using an argument based on category-theoretic models of BI’s proofs. Specifi-
cally, BI’s proofs are modelled by bi-cartesian doubly closed categories, and there is no
endofunctor ! on such a category that satisfies (the interpretation of) Equation (1).
Returning briefly to truth-functional semantics and its resource interpretation, we
remark that LL’s recently developed Kripke semantics [12] does not, as it stands, ad-
mit a direct resource interpretation of the kind outline above. The possibility of such
interpretations is an interesting issue.
Modal extensions of BI, such as MBI [1,9], DBI, and DMBI [13], have been pro-
posed to introduce dynamics into resource semantics. In recent work, the idea of intro-
ducing agents, together with their knowledge, into the resource semantics has led to an
Epistemic Separation Logic, called ESL, in which epistemic possible worlds are con-
sidered as resources [14]. This logic corresponds to an extension of Boolean BI with a
knowledge modality, Ka, such that Kaφ means that the agent a knows that φ holds.
Various previous works on epistemic logics consider the concept of resource, using
a variety of approaches. They include [3,24,29]. Here we aim to explore more deeply
the idea of epistemic reasoning [16] in the context of resource semantics, and its as-
sociated logic, by taking the basic epistemic modality Ka and parametrizing it with a
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resource s, with the associated introduction of relations not only between resources,
according to an agent, but also between composition of resources in different ways.
The parametrizing resource may be thought of as being associated with, or local to, the
agent. This approach leads to the definition of two new modalities Lsa and Msa, and,
consequently, to a new logic in which, as a leading example, we can obtain an account
of access to resources and its control, whether they be pieces of knowledge, locations,
or other entities. We call this logic Epistemic Resource Logic or ERL.
In Section 2, we set up the logic ERL by a semantic definition and, in Section 3, we
give the key conservative extension properties of the logic and also introduce a useful
sublogic, ERL∗. In Section 4, we explain how to use the logic to model and reason about
the relationship between a security policy — in the context of access control — and the
system to which it is applied (cf. Schneier’s Gate problem [38]). Our application to
systems security policy stands in contrast to other work (e.g., [33]) in which epistemic
logic has been applied to the analysis of cryptographic protocols. We complete this
section with other examples, including joint access and semaphores, which illustrate the
applicability of ERL in these perspectives. In Section 5, we set up a labelled tableaux
calculus for ERL, and establish soundness with respect to ERL’s semantic definition
and also completeness from a countermodel extraction method. Let us note that we
apply the approach and techniques already used for designing such labelled tableaux
for other modal extensions of BBI [13–15]. Details of the arguments are provided in
the appendices. Our arguments encompass also the sublogic ERL∗.
Further work will be devoted to further study of the logic and its variants, including
intuitionistic and dynamic systems, to local reasoning for resource-carrying agents [25,
37], to connections with other approaches to modelling the relationship between policy
and implementation in system management [39], and to approaches involving logics for
layered graphs [1,10]. The work presented here builds upon and strongly develops early
ideas presented in [20].
2 An epistemic resource logic
Epistemic logic is the logic of knowledge and belief. It is concerned with what agents
know and believe. The knowledge and beliefs of agents are represented using modalities
which assert the truth of propositions relative to agents’ judgements of the relationship
between worlds [16]. In the setting of resource semantics, worlds are interpreted as
representing available resources and agents make judgements about the equivalence of
resources.
The language L of the epistemic resource logic, or ERL, is obtained by adding
two new modal operators L and M to the BI language. In order to define the language
of ERL, we introduce the following structures: a finite set of agents A; a finite set of
resources Res, with a particular element, e; an internal composition operator · on Res
(· : Res×Res ⇀ Res); a countable set of propositional symbols Prop. The language L
of ERL is defined as follows:
φ ::= p | ⊥ | > | ¬φ | I | φ∨ψ | φ∧ψ | φ→ φ | φ∗φ | φ−∗φ | Lsaφ |Msaφ,
where p ∈ Prop, a ∈ A and s ∈ Res.
6
In this context we call s the agent’s local resource. We also define the following
operators: M˜saφ ≡ ¬Msa¬φ and L˜saφ ≡ ¬Lsa¬φ. The meanings of these connectives are
defined in the sequence of definitions that follow below. For simplicity, we write rs
instead of r · s and so write Lrsa φ instead of Lr·sa φ.
Note that we introduce modalities that depend on agents and resources, and compare
them with previous work on an epistemic extension of Boolean BI [14]. With a slight
abuse of notation, we have explicit resources in the language syntax: just as in [15],
we must assume that the resource elements present in the syntax of the modalities have
counterparts in the partial resource monoid semantics. This design choice has conse-
quences both for the expressivity of the logic and for the formulation of the tableaux
calculus. In the sequel, ↓ denotes definedness and ↑ undefinedness.
Definition 1 (Partial resource monoid). A partial resource monoid (PRM) is a struc-
ture R = (R,•) such that
– R is a set of resources such that Res⊆ R (which notably means that e ∈ R), and
– • : R×R ⇀ R is an operator on R such that, for all r1,r2,r3 ∈ R,
- • is an extension of ·: if r1,r2,r3 ∈ Res, then r1 = r2 · r3 iff r1 = r2 • r3,
- e is a neutral element: r1 • e ↓ and r1 • e = r1,
- • is commutative: if r1 • r2 ↓, then r2 • r1 ↓ and r2 • r1 = r1 • r2, and
- • is associative: if r1 • (r2 • r3) ↓, then (r1 • r2)• r3 ↓ and
(r1 • r2•)r3 = r1 • (r2 • r3).
We call e the unit resource and • the resource composition. Henceforth,℘(R) denotes
the powerset of R.
Note that we implicitly consider that the resource composition • is compatible with
equality between resources. That means that if r1 = r2 and r1 • r3 ↓, then r2 • r3 ↓ and
r2 • r3 = r1 • r3 (right-composition property of •). We also have the left-composition
since • is commutative.
Definition 2 (Model). A model is a triple M = (R ,{∼a}a∈A,V ) such that
– R = (R,•) is a PRM,
– for all a ∈ A, ∼a⊆ R×R is an equivalence relation, and
– V : Prop→℘(R) is a valuation function.
We can place this logic in the context of our previous work on modal [9,10] and epis-
temic extensions of (Boolean) BI [13,14]. In [14], an epistemic extension of Boolean
BI, called ESL, is introduced. In this logic, there is just one epistemic modality, Ka,
which allows the knowledge of an agent a to be expressed. The modalities employed in
this system and those employed in the system presented herein stand in contrast to the
modalities of the system LSM described in Section 1 in that they make essential use of
the notion of agent in their definition.
More formally, the semantics of this modality is defined by r |=M Kaφ if and only if,
for all r′ such that r ∼a r′, r′ |=M φ, where r and r′ are semantic worlds (or resources)
and ∼a is a relation between worlds that expresses that they are equivalent from the
point of view of the agent a. The parametrization of modalities on resources derives
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from ideas that are conveniently expressed in, for example, [9,10].
In this paper, we aim to develop the idea in order to consider a modality like Ka and
to parametrize it on a resource s, requiring the world relation to be of the form r•s∼a r′
or r∼a r′ •s or even r•s∼a r′ •s. Then, in the spirit of ESL, we define a new logic from
Boolean BI that allows us to model not only relations between resources according to
an agent, but also how those relations are restricted by resources. We can also consider
the resources upon which the agent’s relation are parametrized to be local to the agent.
In this spirit, we define two new modalities Lsaφ and Msaφ, with the notation build-
ing on the usual one in epistemic logic, for which we have the following semantics
expressing two forms of the agent’s contingency for truth in the presence of compos-
able resources:
1. Lsaφ expresses that the agent, a, can establish the truth of φ using a given resource
whenever the ambient resource, r, can be combined with the agent’s local resource,
s, to yield a resource that a judges to be equivalent to that given resource.
In other words Lsaφ is true relative to the ambient resource, r, iff for a’s views of
the combination of the ambient resource, r, and its local resource, s, φ is true. More
formally we have
r |=M Lsaφ iff if r • s ↓ then for all r′ ∈ R, if r • s∼a r′, then r′ |=M φ
2. Msaφ expresses that the agent, a, can establish the truth of φ if there exists a resource
that can be combined with its local resource, s, such that a judges the combined
resource to be equivalent to the ambient resource, r.
In other words Msaφ is true relative to the ambient resource, r, iff for a’s views, the
ambient resource is the combination of the local resource, s, with another resource
that makes φ true. More formally we have
r |=M Msaφ iff there exists r′ ∈ R such that r′ • s ↓ and r ∼a r′ • s and r′ • s |=M φ
ERL can thus be seen as a particular epistemic logic that provides new modalities
which model access to resources, whether they are interpreted as pieces of knowledge,
locations, or otherwise.
Note that we could obtain operators with similar semantics by taking the epistemic
separation logic ESL [14] and adding it the hybrid operators of the hybrid logic HyBBI
[4]. Such a new logical framework would allow us to use symbols, called nominals, that
force a formula to be valid for a specific resource. Namely, if we consider a nominal ns
forcing the resource s, we then could define the modality Lsaφ by Lsaφ≡ ns−∗Kaφ and
we recover the semantics given in this section for this modality. Moreover, we could
also define the modality Msaφ by Msaφ ≡ K˜a((>∗ ns)∧ φ). Observations like this are
quite common for logics of the kinds considered heren but our view is that conceptual
clarity, rather than syntactic ingenuity, should drive the design choices.
This hybrid approach based on nominals represents a significant technical addition
to our semantic assumptions that is not justified by the motivations of resource seman-
tics, adding a confusion between resources and propositions that we consider to be in-
convenient for our intended modelling applications. Moreover, we would argue that the
8
identities between the modalities that are induced obscures rather than elucidates their
meaning — although we would concede that the identities may be of use in mechanical
implementations — and leads to a less elegant analysis. Furthermore, working with the
hybrid semantics requires additional work in setting the tableaux-based metatheory for
the logic, as discussed in Section 5.
It therefore seems appropriate to add the epistemic operators systematically in a
clean semantic setting.
Definition 3 (Satisfaction and validity). Let M = (R ,{∼a}a∈A,V ) be a model. The
satisfaction relation |=M⊆ R×L is defined, for all r ∈ R, as follows:
r |=M p iff r ∈V (p)
r |=M ⊥ never
r |=M > always
r |=M ¬φ iff r 6|=M φ
r |=M φ∨ψ iff r |=M φ or r |=M ψ
r |=M φ∧ψ iff r |=M φ and r |=M ψ
r |=M φ→ ψ iff if r |=M φ, then r |=M ψ
r |=M I iff r = e
r |=M φ∗ψ iff there exist r1,r2 ∈ R s.t. r1 • r2 ↓, r1 • r2 = r, and r1 |=M φ and r2 |=M ψ
r |=M φ−∗ψ iff for all r′ ∈ R, if r • r′ ↓ and r′ |=M φ, then r • r′ |=M ψ
r |=M Lsaφ iff if r • s ↓ then for all r′ ∈ R, if r • s∼a r′, then r′ |=M φ
r |=M Msaφ iff there exists r′ ∈ R such that r′ • s ↓ and r ∼a r′ • s and r′ • s |=M φ.
A formula φ is valid, denoted  φ, if and only if, for any model W and any resource r,
we have r |=M φ.
Proposition 1 (Satisfaction for the secondary modalities). LetM =(R ,{∼a}a∈A,V )
be a model, and let r ∈ R. The following statements hold:
1. r |=M L˜saφ iff if r • s ↓ then there exists r′ ∈ R such that r • s∼a r′ and r′ |=M φ;
2. r |=M M˜saφ iff for all r′ ∈ R, if r′ • s ↓ and r ∼a r′ • s, then r′ • s |=M φ.
Proof. Consider the first part, 1. L˜saφ ≡ ¬Lsa¬φ, so r |=M L˜saφ iff r |=M ¬Lsa¬φ iff
r 6|=M Lsa¬φ iff there exists r′ ∈ R s.t. r• s∼a r′ and r′ 6|=M ¬φ iff there exists r′ ∈ R s.t.
r • s∼a r′ and r′ |=M φ. Proof of 2 is similar.
More intuitively, we can see that L˜saφ expresses that the agent, a, can establish the
truth of φ if there exists a resource such that the combination of the ambient resource,
r, and the local resource, s, is judged by a to be equivalent to that resource. Similarly,
M˜saφ expresses that the agent, a, can establish the truth of φ using a resource that is the
combination of its local resource, s, with any resource such that a judges the combined
resource to be equivalent to the ambient resource, r. We shall see later that these dual
modalities can be also useful for modelling systems.
Returning to the possible representation of the modalities in an hybrid version of
ESL, we could then define these modalities as follows: L˜saφ≡ (>∗ns)∧K˜aφ and M˜saφ≡
Ka((>∗ns)→ φ), with ns being a nominal forcing the resource s. As we have previously
explained, here we aim at avoiding confusion between resources (which are part of
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the model) and propositions (which are part of the language) that we consider to be
inconvenient for our intended modelling applications.
Note that the first point of the definition of •, in Definition 1, implies that the three
other definitions (neutral element, commutativity, and associativity) extend to ·, so that
the following are semantically equivalent (i.e., every valid formula in the one is valid
in the other) for any agent a and any resources r, s, and t: Lrea φ ≡ Lraφ, Lrsa ≡ Lsra , and
Lr(st)a ≡ L(rs)ta . Of course, such equivalences also hold for Mφ, L˜φ, and M˜φ.
3 Some properties of ERL
We show that ERL is a conservative extension of Boolean BI (BBI) and Epistemic
Logic (EL) and that, in the presence of additional properties of the partial resource
monoid (Definition 1), there are some noteworthy relationships between modalities.
We consider two fragments of ERL. First, ERLBBI — corresponding to BBI [25]
— with A = /0 on the language L|BBI defined as L excluding the Lsa and Msa opera-
tors. Second, ERLEL — corresponding to the epistemic logic EL consisting of classical
propositional additives and the basic epistemic operator Ka [16] — with Res = {e}, on
the language L|EL defined as L excluding I, ∗, and −∗ and with Lsa and Msa, replaced by
the operator Ka, which is defined, for all agents a, by Kaφ= Leaφ= Meaφ.
Proposition 2 (ERL is a conservative extension of BBI and EL). If, in every model
of BBI, the neutral element of the composition is the element e of Res, then ERLBBI is
semantically equivalent to Boolean BI (BBI). If the agent sets are the same for the two
languages, ERLEL is semantically equivalent to the epistemic logic EL.
We now consider some properties of ERL; specifically, the way in which the differ-
ent operators behave when they are used together in formulae. One interesting property
we might require in our semantics, which is based on monoidal structure, is the compat-
ibility of∼a and •. More precisely, we might require that if two resources are equivalent
for an agent a, then the composition with a third resource be transferred through this
equivalence.
Although such a property can be very useful, it introduces, from the modelling
perspective, some quite strong properties: the transmission of properties of resources
through agent-dependent equivalence is a strong assertion regarding agents’ private ac-
cesses, and should be avoided when modelling some security properties.
Considering these concerns, we take this extra property to be optional, and identify
it in a sublogic of ERL which we call ERL∗.
Definition 4. The logic ERL∗ is defined as ERL with the addition of the following prop-
erty to the partial resource monoid (Definition 1):
For any agent a and any resources r,r′ ∈ R, if r • s ↓ and r ∼a r′, then r′ • s ↓ and
r • s∼a r′ • s. It is called the compatibility of ∼a with •.
Note that we use the logic ERL∗ in the security modelling examples that we develop
in the next section.
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Lemma 1. Let a ∈ A be an agent, s, t ∈ Res be resources and φ be a formula of ERL∗.
We have the following properties:
1. Lsa(Ltaφ)≡ Lsta φ
2. Msa(Mtaφ)→Mtaφ
3. Lsaφ→ M˜ta(Lsaφ)
4. Mta(L˜saφ)→ L˜saφ.
5. L˜ta(L˜saφ)≡ L˜tsa φ
6. M˜saφ→ M˜ta(M˜saφ)
7. Leaφ≡ M˜eaφ
Proof. First consider 1. Let W be a model and r be a resource. Suppose that r |=M
Lsa(Ltaφ). Then we have r • s ↓ and, for any r′ ∈ R such that r • s∼a r′, we have r′ |=M
Ltaφ. Thus r • s ↓ and, for any r′ ∈ R such that r • s ∼a r′, r′ • t ↓, and for any r′′ ∈ R
such that r′ • t ∼a r′′, we have r′′ |=M φ. Consider r′′′ ∈ R such that r • s • t ∼a r′′′. By
reflexivity, we obtain r • s ∼a r • s. Then with r′ = r • s and r′′ = r′′′, we have r • s• t ↓
and r′′′ |=M φ. Thus r |=M Lsta φ, and we can deduce that Lsa(Ltaφ)→ Lsta φ.
Now suppose that r |=M Lsta φ. Then r•s•t ↓ and, for any r′′′ such that r•s•t ∼a r′′′,
we have r′′′ |=M φ. As r• s• t ↓, we have r• s ↓. Let r′ ∈ R be such that r• s∼a r′. Then,
by compatibility, r′ • t ↓ and r • s • t ∼a r′ • t. Let r′′ be such that r′ • t ∼a r′′. Then, by
transitivity, we have r • s • t ∼a r′′. Then, with r′′′ = r′′, we have r′′ |=M φ. We obtain
r • s ↓ and, for any r′ ∈ R such that r • s ∼a r′, r′ • t ↓ and for any r′′ ∈ R such that
r′ • t ∼a r′′, we have r′′ |=M φ. Then we have r |=M Lsa(Ltaφ), and then we can deduce
Lsta φ→ Lsa(Ltaφ). Finally, we have Lsa(Ltaφ)≡ Lsta φ.
Now consider 6. Let W be a model and r be a resource. Suppose that r |=M M˜saφ.
Then, for any r′ such that r′ • s ↓ and r ∼a r′ • s, we have r′ • s |=M φ. Let r′′ such that
r′′ • t ↓ and r ∼a r′′ • t and r′′′ such that r′′′ • s ↓ and r′′ • t ∼a r′′′ • s. By transitivity we
deduce that r ∼a r′′′ • s and if we fix r′ = r′′′ we have r′′′ • s |=M φ. As it is true for any
r′′′ such that r′′′ • s ↓ and r′′ • t ∼a r′′′ • s, we have r′′ |=M M˜saφ. As it is true that, for any
r′′ such that r′′ • t ↓ and r ∼a r′′ • t, we have r |=M M˜ta(M˜saφ), then for any resource r in
any model W , M˜saφ→ M˜ta(M˜saφ) is valid.
Note that the reverse implication, M˜ta(M˜saφ)→ M˜saφ, is not valid. In fact, if r |=M
M˜ta(M˜saφ), φ is validated by all r′′ • s such that r ∼a r′ • t and r′ • t ∼a r′′ • s. But to have
r |=M M˜saφ, we must have r′′′ • s |=M φ for all r′′′ such that r ∼a r′′′ • s, and not only
for those for which the equivalence by ∼a is built from t. Then there is no equivalence
between M˜saφ and M˜ta(M˜saφ).
All of the other cases are proved in similar ways.
We can complete our language with another modality Nsaφ that could be also helpful
for our modelling perspectives. From this modality, that is a variant of Lsaφ, we can also
derive N˜saφ such that N˜saφ≡ ¬Nsa¬φ.
Nsaφ expresses that the agent, a, can establish the truth of φ using any resource
combined with its local resource, s, provided a judges that combination to be equivalent
to the combination of the local resource , s, with the ambient resource, r. In other words
Nsaφ is true relative to the ambient resource r iff for a’s views of the combination of the
ambient resource r and its local resource s, φ is true. More formally we have:
r |=M Nsaφ iff if r • s ↓ then for all r′ ∈ R s.t. r′ • s ↓ if r • s∼a r′ • s, then r′ • s |=M φ.
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We can built Nsaφ from the previous main modalities as follows.
Proposition 3. We have Nsaφ≡ Lsa(M˜saφ).
Proof. Consider that r |=M Lsa(M˜saφ) iff, for all r′ ∈ R, if r • s ∼a r′, then r′ |=M M˜saφ
iff, for all r′ ∈ R, if r • s ∼a r′, then, for all r′′ ∈ R, if r′ ∼a r′′ • s, then r′′ • s |=M φ iff,
for all r′,r′′ ∈ R, if r • s∼a r′ and r′ ∼a r′′ • s, then r′′ • s |=M φ iff (by the transitivity of
∼a), for all r′′ ∈ R, if r • s∼a r′′ • s, then r′′ • s |=M φ iff r |=M Nsaφ.
4 Modelling access control with the logic ERL∗
In this section, we illustrate how to use ERL, and its special sublogic ERL∗, in mod-
elling access control situations.
Security policies, such as those for access control, are often formulated separately
from the architectural context in which they are intended to be applied. This can lead to
the existence of vulnerabilities. Specifically, when a particular security policy is applied
to a particular system, the security properties of the resulting system may not be as
intended.
We aim to illustrate that the new operators Lsa and Msa are appropriate for modelling
situations where the access to resources (whether they are locations or pieces of data)
is central. Indeed, both operators can be used to specify (in a slight different flavour)
whether a resource verifies a property in agent’s a perspective, granted that the local
resource s is present.
Before developing our examples, we recall that there exists a body of work based on
Linear Logic (LL) and multiset rewriting for modelling some access control problems
in specific situations. For example, multiset rewriting has been used to characterize se-
curity protocols [7]. Our aim here, however, is to provide a more general framework
that can be a modelling tool in many situations rather than be an ad hoc creation spe-
cific to a context. Even if such a framework based on Linear Logic and modalities for
authorization and knowledge exists [22], we consider the differences between LL and
BBI that make the later a more convenient tool for modelling. Both are able to model
aspects of the properties of resources, but in LL propositions represent resources while
in BBI (and, indeed, in BI) propositions represent properties of resources that can be ex-
pressed within the Kripke structures supporting resource semantics. LL focuses on the
production and consumption — essentially counting — of resources while BBI focuses
on separation and sharing of properties on resources. Modal extensions of BBI extend
this view to incorporate the production and consumption of resources via the effects of
actions in action modalities [13,15].
Because — as explained in the introduction and in a substantial body of literature
[34] — the semantics of BBI can be interpreted as being a theory of resources and their
properties, we can directly use resources as tokens in our modelling of systems [8]. Of
particular note in this paper is the use of local resources. For example, s in r  Lsa is of
the same nature, but doesn’t have the same role, as the ambient resource r. This allows
a simple integration of new actors of a system into a modelling using ERL and avoids
the creation of new formal elements of a more ad hoc nature.
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4.1 Modelling distributed systems
The construction of mathematical models always involves design choices. Our approach
is guided the approach to modelling distributed systems articulated in [1,9]. This ap-
proach builds upon the observation that, from a slightly abstract yet convenient point of
view, the key structural components of a distributed systems are the following:
- Locations. The basic architecture of the system is considered to be described by a
collection of connected places. Mathematically, we need some topological struc-
ture, with directed graphs be perhaps the most commonly useful set-up.
- Resources. Resources are situated at the locations identified in the system’s archi-
tecture. They are the components of the system that are manipulated — that is, con-
sumed, created, moved, and so on — as the system evolves in order to the deliver
the services that it is intended to provide. Mathematically, we take the ‘resource
monoids’ adopted in, for example, the semantics of BI, in Separation Logic and,
indeed, in ERL. In the intuitionistic versions of these logics, we take a partially
ordered (or sometimes preordered) partial monoid of resources. As we have seen
in Section 1, the monoidal composition then captures the combination of resource
elements and the ordering captures the comparison of resource elements. In the
classical versions, we drop the ordering and work just with combination.
- Processes. The services that a system provides are delivered by the execution of
processes, during which resources are manipulated. Mathematically, in formal gen-
erality, we can describe processes using an algebraic calculus of processes. In [8],
we have employed a variation of Milner’s basic system, SCCS [28], adapted to
capture the interaction with resources and locations.
In addition, we require the following concept:
- Environment. When a system is modelled, it is necessary to decide what is its
boundary. Things that are outside of the boundary are not represented in detail
within the model. Nevertheless, the model must interact with its environment. Math-
ematically, this can be represented stochastically, using specified probability distri-
butions to capture events at the boundary.
The structural components collectively represent the state of a system and can be
used to define a process algebra with an operational semantics that defines their co-
evolution as actions occur [1,8,9]:
L,R,E a−→ L′,R′,E ′ .
When building models in this style, it is necessary to set up a notion of signature
for a model. For basic actions a and locations L, we define an evolution
µ(a,L,R) = (L′,R′)
that specifies the effect of a on the resource R at this L. We call µ a modification function.
In this setting, there is an associated modal logic with a satisfaction relation of the
form
L,R,E |= φ,
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which includes both additive and multiplicative action modalities [1,8,9]. Additive ac-
tion modalities yield formulae of the form [a]φ, with a truth condition along the follow-
ing lines:
L,R,E |= [a]φ iff for all E a−→ E ′, L′,R′,E ′ |= φ,
where we need the condition, part of the signature of the model, to the effect that the
occurrence of the action a causes the evolution of L to L′ and R to R′ [1,8,9]. The multi-
plicative modalities allow actions to carry around local resources that can be combined
with the ambient resource — so we consider L,R,E |= [a]S φ and form R′ ◦ S′ in the
definiens of the satisfaction clause — to enable the evolution [1,8,9].
The logic is used both to constrain the model, through situation-specific logical
properties, and to express desired or undesired properties of the system that are to be
checked.
In the setting of modelling access control using ERL, locations, resources, and pro-
cesses can all be represented, although we can make some simplifications.
- Locations. The examples we consider implicitly employ location architectures, but
they are sufficiently simple that they can also be handled implicitly in the formal-
ization, often through the treatment of resources.
- Resources. The resource elements considered carry the structure of resource monoids,
and we make essential use of this in the models.
- Processes. Our examples only deal with the actions that are required to instanti-
ation the epistemic modalities. Nevertheless, we provide discussions of how our
examples can be understood in the location–resource–process context.
In this setting, we elide the modelling of environment: since we are not seeking
to build executable models, this simplification is of little or no consequence for our
present purposes. In these senses, we are making use of a fairly pure version of resource
semantics.
We employ a range of examples of security modelling using this approach. We
begin, in Section 4.2, with ‘Schneier’s Gate’, which illustrates the policy-architecture
gap, and then consider a core systems-security situations of joint access control, in
Section 4.3, and semaphores, in Section 4.4.
4.2 The ‘Schneier’s Gate’ problem
Consider the example of ‘Schneier’s gate’ [38], wherein a security system is ineffective
because of the existence of a side-channel that allows a control to be circumvented.
Here a facility that is intended to be secured is protected by a barrier that prevents cars
from entering into the facility. The barrier may be controlled by a token — such as a
card, a remote, or a code — the holding of which distinguishes authorized personnel
from intruders. If, however, the barrier itself is surrounded by ground that can be tra-
versed by a vehicle, without any kind of fence or wall, then any car can drive around
it (whether it’s with a malicious intent or just by laziness of getting through the secu-
rity procedure) and the access control policy, as implemented by the barrier and the
tokens, is undermined. So, the access control policy — that only authorized personnel,
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Fig. 1. A depiction of the ‘Schneier’s gate’ problem
in possession of a token, may take vehicles into the facility — is undermined by the
architecture of the system to which it is applied.
We show how ERL∗ can be used to model, and so reason about, the situation de-
scribed above (following [38]), illustrating how such situations can be identified by
logical analysis. Related analyses, employing logical models of layered graphs, can be
found in [11].
We follow the approach to distributed systems modelling sketched in Section 4.1
and elaborated in [1,8,9]. We start with a simple model, depicted in Figure 2, and grad-
ually refine it. We model just a facility protected by an access barrier. We will need the
following key components:
– Locations. We assume, for what is an architecturally simple model, just three loca-
tions: outside and inside of the area guarded by the barrier, and the barrier itself.
In this simple setting, there is no need to incorporate an explicit representation of
locations into our model’s worlds.
– Resources. There are just three types of resource: vehicles (cars), access tokens,
which are required to operate the barrier, and a marker for the presence of the
barrier.
– Processes. In this simple setting, we do not need to employ the full, quite complex,
structure of a process algebra; rather, the actions of a logic with action modalities
— in particular, the action modalities of ERL∗, with their epistemic semantics, will
suffice.
In fact, our treatment of resource in this epistemic-logic setting is a little more subtle.
From the modelling perspective, the resources we have exposed here are diverse in na-
ture: there is is a material token (key or card for instance), there are cars, and a just
a marker for the presence and well-functioning of the barrier. This diversity raises the
question of the meaning and value of the unit resource, e. We finesse this problem by
accepting that resources encompass a variety of different objects, but we can also em-
ploy the epistemic nature of our logic and consider that resources represent not objects
as such but rather the knowledge that a given object is in our system.
A vehicle having the appropriate access token should be able to get inside. We con-
sider the following sets of resources, agents, and logical properties of resources/system
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Fig. 2. Barrier problem, base case
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Fig. 3. Barrier problem with agents
states:
Res = {e,b, t,c}, A = {α}, Prop = {O,J}.
Here we have the following:
– the atomic propositions O and J, respectively, express the state of being outside
and inside the facility — we use J instead of I to avoid confusion with I, the unit
operator;
– a resource element b is taken as a marker for the presence and well-functioning of
the barrier;
– a token, required to operate the barrier, is denoted by a resource element t and
vehicles (cars) are denoted by resource elements c, c′, etc.;
– for simplicity we are assuming that all resource elements are of the same sort; that
is, are elements of the same resource monoid; this will cause no formal difficulty in
this simple setting, though richer examples might require more care in this respect;
– u |=M O means that u is outside the facility, and v |=M J means that v is inside.
– the agent α is a generic one that represents a user of the system; that is, say, the vehi-
cle/driver that approaches the access control point. The resources b and t represent
tokens that stand respectively for the barrier and the access token of the users.
So, c can be viewed as an abstract token marking the presence of a car, and t the presence
of the required access device in this car. Thus resources act as an abstraction layer of
our system. In this view, it follows that it is easy to see e as the absence of information
(nothing is known of the system).
We have the following property: O→ Lbtα J. According to the semantics, based on
a resource monoid R, c |=M O→ Lbtα J just in case if c |=M O, then, for every c′ ∈ R
such that c•b• t ∼α c′, c′ |=M J. Thus the combination of the two tokens grants access
to the inside. The use of the token b for the presence of the barrier helps in modelling
a situation in which the barrier is completely shut or is broken (in which case entering
wouldn’t be possible). Note that the formulae O→ LtαJ, O→ LbαJ, and O→ LeαJ are
not valid because we cannot enter if the barrier is shut, if we have no access token, or
both.
The use of the operator Lsα in this situation is illustrative. First, consider what dif-
ferences the use of other operators would make. If we were to state O→ M˜btα J, then it
would mean that anyone outside can get (without condition) inside and acquire the two
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Fig. 4. Barrier problem with a shortcut
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Fig. 5. Barrier problem with a fence
access tokens. This is of course not what we expect. On the other hand, using Nsα has an
interesting effect. O→ Nbtα J requires not only that an entering agent have the expected
tokens, but also that those tokens remain active once they are inside. This is slightly
different from our first approach: we don’t know if the tokens are still active once the
agent is inside.
We can also consider which of the additive implication,→, and the multiplicative,
−∗, would be the better modelling choice in this example. For a first approach,→ seems
quite sufficient. Indeed, if we assert O→ Lbtα J as valid, then any resource satisfies it.
So, if we have a car c such that c |=M O, we also have c |=M O→ Lbtα J, and then we
get the expected c |=M Lbtα J.
However, if we consider more complex properties, the situation is different. Imag-
ine, for example, an environment that is composed not only of the car c, but also another
entity, or piece of information, o. Our epistemic context is thus o•c. If we have c |=M O
and if O→ Lbtα J is valid, then we get c |=M Lbtα J. As we do not have o • c |=M O, we
cannot deduce that o• c |=M Lbtα J.
If instead we assume that the property O−∗Lbtα J is valid, then we have, in particular,
o |=M O−∗Lbtα J and, together with c |=M O, we can deduce o• c |=M Lbtα J, as desired.
So, the use of −∗ instead of → is much more useful in more complex systems, as it
allows us to set aside, as with Separation Logic’s Frame Rule, some of the entities of
our system and still apply the property.
Now we introduce agents to the model (see Figure 3). The first model may seem
crude, because a single resource is used to model the access of any agent. So, we seek
to benefit from the logic that allows us to take agents into account.
We change the model by defining a detailed set of agents, A = {α,β,γ} and now
take three agents or users, α, β, and γ. Each user should have its own access token,
and the resource set is modified accordingly: Res = {e,b, tα, tβ, tγ,c}. Now the slightly
different formula O→ Lbtaa J is valid for any agent a ∈ A. So, for example, O→ Lbtαα J
is valid, which means that α can get inside with his own token, but O→ Lbtβα J is not,
which means α cannot use β’s token.
Now consider the case in which the access is controlled and the agents are supposed
to cross the barrier only if they have the appropriate access device. We want to capture
the fact that the system can actually be flawed (as mentioned in the problem presenta-
tion). It is actually quite easy to do, because being able to circumvent the barrier just
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means being able to access inside of the complex without any token. We could be a little
more specific by imagining that some agents know the shortcut (or dare to use it) and
others don’t (See Figure 4). In the previous setting, suppose that the agent β is aware
of the shortcut and is disposed to use it. Our new set of properties should now be the
following: {
O→ Lbtaa J (for every a ∈ A), O→ LeβJ
}
.
The unit resource e expresses a direct access (with no resource needed). Note how
the use of agents can help us to express different security policies in the same model.
We can reasonably suppose that such a flawed system would be quickly dealt with;
for example, by installing a fence that would prevent going around the barrier (See
Figure 5). We could, of course, just model that by removing our last addition and get
back to the intended policy, but it is more interesting to encode it by a formula. For
example, we might then also describe a fault in the fence (or its removal). To do so, we
can simply add a propositional formula F that is valid for any resource provided there
is a fence preventing the passage of ‘rogue’ agents. Our system then becomes{
O→ Lbtaa J (for every a ∈ A), O∧¬ F → LeβJ
}
.
Having established a system of formulae that describes our modelling situation quite
clearly, we can seek to some properties of the model. The idea is to establish a property
of the system that goes beyond its basic definition. For example, we may want to check
that every agent inside the facility has passed the barrier and has in its possession its
access token. This means that we must prove that, for every agent a ∈ A, J→Mbtaa J.
Indeed, if c |=M J→Mbtaa J, this means that if c |=M J, then there exists c′ ∈ R such
that c∼a c′ •b•ta and c′ •b•ta |=M J, which expresses that every resource representing
a car that is inside must in fact be equivalent, for an agent a ∈ A, to a resource that is
inside and is composed with both the appropriate token ta and the barrier token b. This
is exactly what we wanted to capture.
Notice that this particular property is not verified by the system we described in our
set up. Indeed, noted previously, specifying entrance with r |=M O→ Lbtaa J makes J be
satisfied by any resource r′ such that r •b• ta ∼a r′. We can see that r′ does not contain
b and ta. The use of Nbtaa instead solves this problem: we then have r•b• ta ∼a r′ •b• ta
and r′ •b• ta |=M J, as required.
So far, we have considered only simple situations, mainly one car crossing the bar-
rier in various situations. Of course, we may wish to consider more complex models and
establish similar properties. For example, we may want to see what happen if several
cars are modelled together in the system.
We have the sets of properties in the form of implications stated before. To state
there is a car in the system, we just assert that the formula O is valid. Then, by looking
at the semantics of our formulae, we create a resource c which satisfies that formula. In
order to have several cars, we might at first be tempted to assert something like O∧O∧
O (for three cars). However, given our semantics, we have trivially that O∧O∧O≡O,
which is inconvenient for our modelling purpose. It is better to state O∗O∗O, using the
multiplicative conjunction, instead. Then, to satisfy this formula, we need indeed three
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resources c1,c2,c3 and we have c1 •c2 •c3 |=M O∗O∗O — that is, for each car to gain
access, a a token is required for that car. Then, using −∗ as described above, we can see
the system evolve as cars are allowed inside. Thus, the use of ∗ is particularly relevant
to model several instances of a same object.
Of course, we could easily enrich this model to make more distinctions between
different cars and their different properties, but the essentials of the model would remain
the same.
4.3 Joint access
One of the most common problems of access control is joint access and we propose to
model a very simple example with our logic. The background for this example can be
found in many films about the cold war era: the situation is that a critical system —
such as one that controls the release of nuclear weapons, as in ‘Crimson Tide’ [5] —
is secured by two different keys, each one held by a different operator. For the system
to unlock, it is necessary that both operators activate their keys simultaneously. We
provide a logical analysis of this situation.
From our systems modelling perspective, we can set this up quite simply, as depicted
in Figure 6.
l1 l2
l3
l4
a b
a • b
k1 k2
k1 • k2
Fig. 6. Joint access
Some of the modelling choices made here are quite obvious: we need two agents,
and two associated resources representing their keys. So, we take A= {α,β} and Res=
{k1,k2,e}. Implicitly, the formulae will express that α is associated to k1 and β to k2.
Also implicitly, we are employing four locations, l1 – l4, so that we can sketch a system
model as
l1 , k1 , α : Unlock1 : 0
α−→ l3 , k1 ,Unlock1 : 0
l2 , k2 , β : Unlock2 : 0
β−→ l3 , k2 ,Unlock2 : 0
l3 , k1 • k2 ,Unlock1 : 0×Unlock2 : 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
def
= Unlock
α•β−→ l4 , k1 • k2 , 0,
where l3 • l3 def= l3, and where the modification function of the model, which describes
how the keys move from location to location, is given by
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- µ(α, l3,k1 • k2) = (l4,k1 • k2),
- µ(α, l1,k1) = (l3,k1), and
- µ(α, l2,k2) = (l3,k2).
Focussing on our logical modelling, and suppressing for now the location architec-
ture, we must express the fact that each agent — representing here a simplified notion of
process — must use its key. Of course, as the whole point of the example is to illustrate
how two separate accesses unlock the system, thus each use of key must be modelled
with a different formula. We propose the following formulae for this purpose:
Mk1α > and Mk2β >.
We use the atomic formula > since we don’t need to access any property — rather
we need only to update α and β’s accessible worlds to express that k1 and k2 are now
activated. If we consider Mk1α > for instance, then if r |=M Mk1α >, then there exists a
resource r′ such that r ∼α r′ • k1 and r′ • k1 |=M >. Given this last statement, we have
that there exists r′ such that r ∼α r′ • k1. Thus, with this formula we have stated that α
can reach a state in which k1 is activated. The second formula states the same for b and
k2.
We must express that whenever both keys are present, the system can be unlocked.
We could consider using a formula such as M˜k1k2α U , where U is an atomic formula ex-
pressing that the system is unlocked. However, we can see at once that this choice is
problematic. Indeed, this formula is dependent on α, but the point of joint access is that
none of the agents involved is responsible on its own for the activation of the device.
Moreover, should we decide to proceed with such a formula, it would fail to do the
required job — k2 is brought in the system by β and only α is present in the formula.
Obviously, using β instead of α raises the same problems (symmetrically).
It seems, therefore, that our model lacks (at least) an agent. We introduce an om-
nipotent agent o (and thus A = {α,β,o}). The idea is to have an agent that can see and
use whatever α and β can, without the two sharing knowledge or potential action. This
agent can be interpreted either as a global authority or just as a modelling of the device
itself (the computer that accepts the keys and executes the order). Now, with this extra
agent, M˜k1k2o U seems to be an acceptable candidate for modelling the unlocking of the
system. This states that whichever state reachable for o that contains k1 and k2 triggers
the unlocking. However, we still need to express o’s capability. To do that, we introduce
the following set of formulae:
{Msaφ→Msoφ | a ∈ A, s ∈ Res, φ ∈ L} .
This expresses that any access to a resource by an agent through the modality M can be
transferred to o. Of course, in a more general setting, we could state similar things for
the other operators, but, in this very particular example, only M will be useful.
Finally, in order to the system to work, we need to activate both keys simultaneously.
A first approach could be to append the two key-activation with an ∧: Mk1α >∧Mk2β >.
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This doesn’t produce the desired result. Indeed, if r |=M Mk1α >∧Mk2β >, then we get
r ∼α r′ • k1 and r ∼β r′′ • k2 and we intended to have the combination of k1 and k2,
which is here not obvious. Thus, the best way is in fact to use Mk1α >∗Mk2β >. More than
the simple correctness of our modelling, this use of ∗ is quite convincing, as we aimed
to model the separated use of two keys.
Thus we have modelled our situation as follows:
1. ∀ ag ∈ A, ∀s ∈ Res, ∀φ ∈ L , Msagφ→Msoφ;
2. Mk1α >∗Mk2β >;
3. M˜k1k2o U .
We can check that this has the desired effect; that is, that whenever both keys are
present, the system can be unlocked. Consider a resource r that forces (2) and (3). The
forcing of (3), unpacked, means
for all r′ such that r ∼o r′ • k1 • k2, r′ • k1 • k2 |=M U.
On the other side, unpacking of (2) gives
there exist r1,r2 such that r = r1 • r2 and r1 |=M Mk1α > and r2 |=M Mk2β >.
We can then instantiate (1) twice, with ag = α, s = k1, and φ = >, then with ag = β,
s = k2, and φ=> to get
there exist r1,r2 such that r = r1 • r2 and r1 |=M Mk1o > and r2 |=M Mk2o >.
Unpacking this, we get
there exist r1,r2,r′1,r
′
2 such that r = r1 • r2 and r1 ∼o r′1 • k1 and r2 ∼o r′2 • k2.
By the compatibility of • and ∼, we obtain that r ∼o r′1 • k1 • r2 and then that r ∼o
r′1 • k1 • r′2 • k2, which by commutativity is r ∼o r′1 • r′2 • k1 • k2. Then we have r′1 • r′2 •
k1 • k2 |=M U , as required.
4.4 Semaphores
Another important example of modelling in access control is concerned with concur-
rency in parallel programming. We have described in the introduction how Separation
Logic, built on BI, is a powerful and efficient tool to model memory management. We
propose, in this section, an example of a similar work with ERL* in which we use it to
model programs accessing memory and the particular example of simple concurrency
with semaphores.
First, we establish the general basis of our modelling approach. We consider a multi-
processor (or a set of different systems) which is seeking to run multiple programs or
tasks with a limited amount of memory space.
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- The set R of resources will represent the memory of the system, Res being a subset
of the memory specified for each problem. e always denotes an empty set of infor-
mation in the memory. Thus, in this example, we again suppress location, conflating
it with resource.
- The set of agents A represents all the different threads or processes which are run-
ning the tasks.
- Two parts, m and m′, of the memory are linked by the relationship ∼α if the access
to m is equivalent to the access to m′ for the process α.
- Finally, we use propositions of ERL* to model programs run by the thread. Thus,
when we write m |=M P, we mean that the memory stored in m is used to run the
program P.
Just as in the example of joint access, we can set up our modelling of semaphores in
the context of our general approach to systems modelling. We suppress the details here,
preferring to use the simplified approach afforded by the logical tools introduced in
this paper, but see [15] for examples of similar models that more closely following the
system modelling approach.
So, consider how to model semaphores in this context. Recall that semaphores are
simple bits of program which use flags or tokens to ensure that a specific portion of
program, called critical section, is always accessed by at most one process. We use
an arbitrary set of agents A, and the set of resources Res = {e, t}, where t is a token
marking the entrance into the critical section. We also have two propositions C and NC,
the former being the critical section of code, the latter being all the non-critical part of
the code. Note that, here, the agents correspond to processes.
We consider the following formulae, which constrain the model, for any arbitrary
process α ∈ A:
1. Guard: for any α′,α′′ ∈ A s.t. α′ 6= α′′, L˜tα′>→¬L˜tα′′>;
2. In : NC→ LtαC;
3. Out : C→ ((¬Mtα>)∧MeαNC).
The Guard formulae, true for any two different processes α′ and α′′, ensure that two
processes cannot enter a critical section together. Indeed, if, for any Guard formula, we
have that m |=M Guard, then, if there is m′ such that m• t ∼α′ m′, there is no m′′ such
that m• t ∼α′′ m′′. That is, for any process p′ which has the token t in memory, no other
process p′′ can get the token.
The In formula specifes that the process α enters the critical section. If we have
that m |=M In, then, if m |=M NC, then, for any m′ such that m• t ∼α m′, we have that
m′ |=M C. That is, if a process is running the non-critical section, the addition of the
token t gives it access to a memory state sufficient to run the critical section.
Symmetrically, the Out formula expresses the exit of p from a critical section. If
m |=M Out, then, if m |=M C, then, for all m′ such that m ∼α m′ • t, m′• 6|=M >. That
is, there is no m′ such that m ∼α m′ • t. This allows us to delete t from the memory
accessible by α. The second part of the formula, MeαNC, states that there is a state m′′
such that m∼α m′′ and m′′ |=M NC; that is, α gets back into non-critical section.
No memory state that satisfies NC after C has been executed, can have t in it. So,
once this formula is taken into account, either p can continue to execute C or go into
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NC and release the token t. We can now see whether the guard we proposed is sufficient
to ensure us that no two processes can get the critical section together. We do that in a
simple way, by introducing the (new) formula NC∗NC. If we have m |=M NC∗NC, then
we have m = m1 •m2, with m1 |=M NC and m2 |=M NC. This is a fair representation of
two processes running the non-critical section in parallel, each one using a different part
of the memory (cf. the treatment of concurrent composition in [1,9] and in Concurrent
Separation Logic [32]).
Now consider a process α1 and suppose it has access to the token; that is, there
exists m′1 such that m1 • t ∼α1 m′1. If In is valid, then we have in particular that m1 |=M
In and thus we have m′1 |=M C. Now, α1 is executing the critical section with m′1.
Could another process α2 access the critical section with m2? The guard should avoid
it. Indeed, if Guard is valid, then we have m |=M Guard. Yet, we have established
that m1 • t ∼α1 m′1. We also have that m = m1 •m2 and, by right composition, we have
m1 •m2 • t ∼α1 m′1 •m2, thus m• t ∼α1 m′1 •m2. By applying m |=M Guard with α′ = α1
and α′′ = α2, we have that there is no m′ such that m • t ∼α2 m′. Now, if α2 were to
access the critical section with m2, then we should have m′2 such that m2 • t ∼α2 m′2.
Then we should have that m • t ∼α2 m′2 •m1 which would contradict what we stated
before. Thus α2 cannot enter the critical section.
However, once in this situation, as we have m′1 |=M C, we can use Out to let α1
out of the critical section. As m′1 |=M Out, we generate m′1 |=M ¬Mtα1> and m′1 |=M
Meα1NC. The first tells us that there is no m
′ such that m′1 ∼α1 m′ • t. But, in our premiss,
we have that m′1 ∼α1 m1 • t. Those two facts are contradictory. Thus, if we want to use
this formula, we have to delete the relation m′1 ∼α1 m1 • t. This guarantees that t is no
longer in α1’s grasp. The second part, m′1 |=M Meα1NC, gives us a new memory state m′′1
such that m′1 ∼α1 m′′1 and m′′1 |=M NC. Thus α1 is back in non-critical state. Note that
once m′1 ∼α1 m1 • t is deleted, the guard ceases to be applicable, and nothing prevents
α2 from entering the critical section this time.
4.5 Evolution in LL, BI, and ERL
It is perhaps worthwhile pausing at this point to compare the representation of system
evolution that is available here with that which is available in Linear Logic (LL). First,
we should note that the nature of the system model employed here is quite different
from that which would derive from a representation based on LL. Second, in our set-
ting, as we have explained, we employ a truth-functional instantiation of the general
distributed systems modelling approach based on concepts of location, resource, and
process. In the examples of this paper, the account of process is very limited, being
restricted to the actions of epistemic agents (with no rich process-theoretic structure).
Third, as a result of these design choices, the readily available account of evolution re-
quires unpacking the truth-functional semantics, which can be see in terms of tableaux
proofs (as presented in Section 5). Experience from, for example, Separation Logic [37]
suggests that the presence (as in Boolean BI and ERL and ERL∗) of a negation with the
standard classical semantics is a very useful modelling tool.
In contrast, representations using LL’s sequent calculus, such as the logic program-
ming approach described in [2,26], employ a less rich modelling perspective — re-
stricted to proofs of sequences of resource manipulations — but then give a very direct
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operational reading of evolution in this restricted setting. A proof-theoretic treatment of
some underlying ideas in LL may be found in [6]. Note, however, that BI includes MILL
as a fragment (as we have seen) and that the basic propositional systems for BI can be
presented as sequent calculi with well-understood relationships with LL. Within the
multiplicative fragment of BI, the same readings of resource evolution can, of course,
be obtained — we do not consider it worthwhile to rehearse these readings in the con-
text of our examples, which are intended to illustrate resource semantics. We conjecture,
therefore, that it is possible to give (perhaps labelled) sequent calculi for ERL and ERL∗
that would provide a similar operational reading of evolution (see the remarks at the be-
ginning of Section 5) to that which is available in LL or the multiplicative fragment of
BI.
To set up a precise correspondence between these evolutions and the semantic rep-
resentation of resource is an interesting issue.
A brief comparison with ‘epistemic linear logic’ [22] — which is about modelling
access control in LL — is perhaps also worthwhile. Again, this work benefits from
the syntactic structures of LL as basis for representing evolution in the setting of the
restricted model of systems that is naturally treated syntactically by LL. Again, in con-
trast, we begin from a more comprehensive systems semantics — which accommodates
a very general notion of resource, including ambient system resources and resources
that are local to agents — and treat similar examples in this restricted instance. Again,
we might expect sequent calculi for ERL and ERL∗ to capture a similar treatment of
evolution to that provided by LL.
5 A tableaux calculus for ERL
In this section, we provide a labelled calculus for ERL in the spirit of the calculi previ-
ously developed for BI [21] and BBI [27] that are based on labels and label constraints
allowing the capture of the semantics of these logics inside the corresponding calcu-
lus. In the case of BBI, a specific completeness proof, based on an oracle, has been
developed in [27].
Similar labelled calculi have been proposed also for some modal and epistemic
extensions of BI and BBI [13–15]. In these cases, the calculus design, used for BBI,
is applied with specific labels and constraints issued from a semantic analysis of the
considered logic. In the case of the labelled calculus for ESL [14], which is an epistemic
extension of BBI, we deal with constraints that are parametrized by agents, but do
not handle the presence of resources in the scope of the modal operators (the local
resources).
While herein provide a tableaux calculus in the continuation of previous works on
modal bunched logics, we note also that we could design a labelled sequent calculus for
ERL and ERL∗ that would also be used to provide an operational reading of evolution
through proof construction as in some LL fragments. However, our aim in this section
is only to provide, by applying an approach and some proof methods already developed
for other modal bunched logics, a labelled tableaux calculus for our logic — both in
order to establish its metatheory and as a general reasoning tool.
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For the present work, we must introduce labels that correspond to the local resources
embedded in operators. As we shall see, we do that through a subset Λr of labels that
is in bijection with the set of local resources Res. Similar techniques have been used
with the logic LSM [15], which extends BBI with resource-parametrized S4 modalities.
Likewise, the proofs of soundness and completeness of the calculus with respect to the
semantics introduced in Section 2 are similar to the ones for ESL, mainly addressing
the need to take the set Λr into account. Revisiting the remarks in Section 2 about
the possibility of working with a hybrid semantics and then relating ERL to a hybrid
version of ESL, we remark that the design of a hybrid tableau calculus would require
some specific work about using nominals and formulas to replace labels and constraints
— and this replacement introduces more complexity and undermines the strong links
with the resource semantics that is central in our approach.
First, we introduce labels and constraints that correspond, respectively, to resources
and to the equality and equivalence relations on resources and agents. Next, we de-
velop labelled tableaux for ERL. Then, we establish soundness with respect to the re-
source semantics, giving the details of the proof in the appendix. Finally, we consider
countermodel extraction and completeness, again giving the details of the proof in the
appendix.
5.1 Labels and constraints
We consider a finite set of constants Λr such that |Λr| = |Res| − 1. On it we build
an infinite countable set of (resource) constants γr such that Λr ⊂ γr, and then γr =
Λr ∪{c1,c2, . . .}. Concatenation of lists is denoted by ⊕; JK denotes the empty list. A
resource label is a word built on γr, where the order of letters is not taken into account;
that is, a finite multiset γr and by ε the empty word. For example, xy is the composition
of the resource labels x and y. We say that x is a resource sublabel of y if and only if
there exists z such that xz = y. The set of resource sublabels of x is denoted E(x).
We define a function λ : Res→ Λr such that:
1. λ(e) = ε;
2. for all r ∈ Res\{e}, λ(r) ∈ Λr; and
3. λ is injective. r = r′).
Note that λ is trivially a bijection between Res and Λr ∪{ε}.
Definition 5 (Constraints). A resource constraint is an expression of the form x ' y,
where x and y are resource labels. An agent constraint is an expression of the form
xPu y, where x and y are resource labels and u belongs to the set of agents A.
A set of constraints is any set C that contains resource constraints and agent con-
straints. Let C be a set of constraints. The (resource) domain of C is the set of all
resource sublabels that appear in C ; that is,
Dr(C ) =
⋃
x'y∈C
(E(x)∪E(y)) ∪
⋃
xPuy∈C
(E(x)∪E(y)).
Let C be a set of constraints. The (resource) alphabet Ar(C ) of C is the set of re-
source constants that appear in C . In particular,Ar(C ) = γr∩Dr(C ). Now we introduce,
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Rules for resource constraints:
〈ε〉ε' ε x' y 〈sr〉y' x
xy' xy 〈dr〉x' x
x' y y' z 〈tr〉x' z
x' y yk ' yk 〈cr〉
xk ' yk
xPu y 〈kr〉x' x
Rules for agent constraints:
x' x 〈ra〉
xPv x
xPu y 〈sa〉
yPu x
xPu y yPu z 〈ta〉
xPu z
xPu y x' k 〈ka〉
k Pu y
Fig. 7. Rules for constraint closure (for any u ∈ A)
in Figure 7, the rules for constraint closure that allow us to capture the properties of the
models into the calculus.
Definition 6 (Closure of constraints). Let C be a set of constraints. The closure of C ,
denoted C , is the least relation closed under the rules of Figure 7 such that C ⊆ C .
There are six rules (〈ε〉, 〈sr〉, 〈dr〉, 〈tr〉, 〈cr〉, and 〈kr〉) that produce resource con-
straints and four rules (〈ra〉, 〈sa〉, 〈ta〉, and 〈ka〉) that produce agent constraints. We note
that v, introduced in the rule 〈ra〉, must belong to the set of agents A.
Proposition 4. The following rules can be derived from the rules of constraint closure:
xk ' y 〈pl〉x' x
x' yk 〈pr〉y' y
xk Pu y 〈ql〉x' x
xPu yk 〈qr〉y' y
xPu y x' x′ y' y′ 〈wa〉
x′ Pu y′
Corollary 1. Let C be a set of constraints and u ∈ A be an agent.
1. x ∈Dr(C ) iff x' x ∈ C iff xPu x ∈ C .
2. If xy ∈Dr(C ), x′ ' x ∈ C , and y′ ' y ∈ C , then xy' x′y′ ∈ C .
Proposition 5. Let C be a set of constraints. We have Ar(C ) = Ar(C ).
Lemma 2 (Compactness). Let C be a (possibly infinite) set of constraints.
1. If x' y ∈ C , then there is a finite set C f such that C f ⊆ C and x' y ∈ C f .
2. If xPu y ∈ C , then there is a finite set C f such that C f ⊆ C and xPu y ∈ C f .
5.2 Labelled tableaux for ERL
We now define a labelled tableaux calculus for ERL in the spirit of previous works
[14,17,21,27] by using similar definitions and results but based on the specific label and
contraints definitions.
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Definition 7. A labelled formula is a 3-tuple of the form (Sφ : x) such that S ∈ {T,F},
φ ∈ L is a formula and x ∈Λr is a resource label. A constrained set of statements (CSS)
is a pair 〈F ,C 〉, where F is a set of labelled formulae and C is a set of constraints,
satisfying the following property, denoted Pcss,
if (Sφ : x) ∈ F , then x' x ∈ C (Pcss).
A CSS 〈F ,C 〉 is finite if F and C are finite. The relation 4 is defined by 〈F ,C 〉 4
〈F ′,C ′〉 iff F ⊆ F ′ and C ⊆ C ′. We write 〈F f ,C f 〉4 f 〈F ,C 〉 when 〈F f ,C f 〉4 〈F ,C 〉
holds and 〈F f ,C f 〉 is finite, meaning that F f and C f are both finite.
Proposition 6. For any CSS 〈F f ,C 〉, where F f is finite, there exists C f ⊆ C such that
C f is finite and 〈F f ,C f 〉 is a CSS.
Proof. By induction on the number of labelled formulae of F f and by Lemma 2.
Figure 8 presents the rules of tableaux calculus for ERL. Note that ‘ci and c j are new
label constants’ means ci 6= c j ∈ γr \ (Ar(C )∪Λr).
Definition 8 (Tableau for ERL). Let 〈F0,C0〉 be a finite CSS. A tableau for 〈F0,C0〉 is
a list of CSSs, called branches, inductively built according the following rules:
1. The one branch list [〈F0,C0〉] is a tableau for 〈F0,C0〉;
2. If the list Tm⊕ [〈F ,C 〉]⊕Tn is a tableau for 〈F0,C0〉 and
cond〈F ,C 〉
〈F1,C1〉 | . . . | 〈Fk,Ck〉
is an instance of a rule of Figure 8 for which cond〈F ,C 〉 is fulfilled, then the list
Tm⊕ [〈F ∪F1,C ∪C1〉; . . . ;〈F ∪Fk,C ∪Ck〉]⊕Tn is a tableau for 〈F0,C0〉.
A tableau for the formula φ is a tableau for 〈{(Fφ : c1)},{c1 ' c1}〉.
We remark that a tableau for a formula φ verifies the property (Pcss) of Definition 7
(by the rule 〈ra〉) and any application of a rule of Figure 8 provides also a tableau that
verifies the property (Pcss) (in particular, by Corollary 1).
In this calculus, we have two particular set of rules. The first set is composed by
the rules 〈TI〉, 〈T∗〉, 〈F−∗〉, 〈FL〉, 〈FM˜〉, 〈FN〉, 〈TL˜〉, 〈TM〉, and 〈TN˜〉, that introduce
new label constants (ci and c j) and new constraints, except for 〈TI〉 that only introduces
a new constraint. The second set is composed of the rules 〈F∗〉, 〈T−∗〉, 〈TL〉, 〈TM˜〉,
〈TN〉, 〈FL˜〉, 〈FM〉, and〈FN˜〉, that have a condition on the closure of constraints. To
apply one of these rules we choose a label which satisfies the condition and then apply
the corresponding rule. Otherwise, we cannot apply the rule.
Definition 9 (Closure conditions). A CSS 〈F ,C 〉 is closed if one of the following con-
ditions holds, where φ ∈ L:
1. (Tφ : x) ∈ F , (Fφ : y) ∈ F and x' y ∈ C ;
2. (FI : x) ∈ F and x' ε ∈ C ;
3. (F> : x) ∈ F ;
27
(TI : x) ∈ F
〈TI〉〈 /0,{x' ε}〉
(T¬φ : x) ∈ F
〈T¬〉〈{(Fφ : x)}, /0〉
(F¬φ : x) ∈ F
〈F¬〉〈{(Tφ : x)}, /0〉
(Tφ∧ψ : x) ∈ F
〈T∧〉〈{(Tφ : x),(Tψ : x)}, /0〉
(Fφ∧ψ : x) ∈ F
〈F∧〉〈{(Fφ : x)}, /0〉 | 〈{(Fψ : x)}, /0〉
(Tφ∨ψ : x) ∈ F
〈T∨〉〈{(Tφ : x)}, /0〉 | 〈{(Tψ : x)}, /0〉
(Fφ∨ψ : x) ∈ F
〈F∨〉〈{(Fφ : x),(Fψ : x)}, /0〉
(Tφ→ ψ : x) ∈ F
〈T→〉〈{(Fφ : x)}, /0〉 | 〈{(Tψ : x)}, /0〉
(Fφ→ ψ : x) ∈ F
〈F→〉〈{(Tφ : x),(Fψ : x)}, /0〉
(Tφ∗ψ : x) ∈ F
〈T∗〉〈{(Tφ : ci),(Tψ : c j)},{x' cic j}〉
(Fφ∗ψ : x) ∈ F and x' yz ∈ C
〈F∗〉〈{(Fφ : y)}, /0〉 | 〈{(Fψ : z)}, /0〉
(Tφ−∗ψ : x) ∈ F and xy' xy ∈ C
〈T−∗〉〈{(Fφ : y)}, /0〉 | 〈{(Tψ : xy)}, /0〉
(Fφ−∗ψ : x) ∈ F
〈F−∗〉〈{(Tφ : ci),(Fψ : xci)},{xci ' xci}〉
(TLruφ : x) ∈ F and xλ(r)Pu y ∈ C 〈TL〉〈{(Tφ : y)}, /0〉
(FLruφ : x) ∈ F 〈FL〉〈{(Fφ : ci)},{xλ(r)Pu ci}〉
(TMruφ : x) ∈ F 〈TM〉〈{(Tφ : ciλ(r))},{xPu ciλ(r)}〉
(FMruφ : x) ∈ F and xPu yλ(r) ∈ C 〈FM〉〈{(Fφ : yλ(r))}, /0〉
(TNruφ : x) ∈ F and xλ(r)Pu yλ(r) ∈ C 〈TN〉〈{(Tφ : yλ(r))}, /0〉
(FNruφ : x) ∈ F 〈FN〉〈{(Fφ : ciλ(r))},{xλ(r)Pu ciλ(r)}〉
(TL˜ruφ : x) ∈ F 〈TL˜〉〈{(Tφ : ci)},{xλ(r)Pu ci}〉
(FL˜ruφ : x) ∈ F and xλ(r)Pu y ∈ C 〈FL˜〉〈{(Fφ : y)}, /0〉
(TM˜ruφ : x) ∈ F and xPu yλ(r) ∈ C 〈TM˜〉〈{(Tφ : yλ(r))}, /0〉
(FM˜ruφ : x) ∈ F 〈FM˜〉〈{(Fφ : ciλ(r))},{xPu ciλ(r)}〉
(TN˜ruφ : x) ∈ F 〈TN˜〉〈{(Tφ : ciλ(r))},{xλ(r)Pu ciλ(r)}〉
(FN˜ruφ : x) ∈ F and xλ(r)Pu yλ(r) ∈ C 〈FN˜〉〈{(Fφ : yλ(r))}, /0〉
Note: ci and c j are new label constants, with ci,c j /∈ Λr.
Fig. 8. Rules of the tableaux calculus for ERL
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4. (T⊥ : x) ∈ F .
A CSS is open if it is not closed. A tableau for φ is closed if all its branches (that is, all
of its CSSs) are closed and a tableaux proof for φ is a closed tableau for φ.
Closed branches are marked with × and open branches are marked with ◦.
Example. Let us consider the formula M˜saφ→ M˜ra(M˜saφ). To build the corresponding
tableau, we start with the CCS 〈{(FM˜saφ→ M˜ra(M˜saφ) : c1)},{c1 ' c1}〉 and with the
following representation of the formula set F and the constraints set C :
[F ] [C ]√
1(FM˜saφ→ M˜ra(M˜saφ) : c1) c1 ' c1
We then apply the rules of our tableaux method, respecting the priority order, and we
obtain the tableau of Figure 9. We omit the λ and write r for λ(r), for any resource.
Note that we mark with
√
the steps of the tableau construction. The main steps are
the following: first apply the rule 〈F→〉 (√1) and then obtain two formulae both with
M˜ as operator. According to the priority rules, first apply the 〈FM˜〉 rule (√2), which
generates a new formula, a new resource label c2, and the constraint c1 Pa c2r. Then
apply the 〈FM˜〉 rule again (√3), which generates a new formula, a new resource label
c3, and the constraint c2r Pa c3s. We must now apply the 〈TM˜〉 rule (√4) and then we
need a resource label z such that c1 Pa zs ∈ C .
Now, having closure by rule 〈ta〉 with agent a, we generate the constraint c1 Pa c3s,
and thus apply the rule with z = c1 and generate (Tφ : c3s). As we also have (Fφ : c3s),
we have a closed branch and thus a closed tableau.
[F ]
√
1 (FM˜saφ→ M˜ra(M˜saφ) : c1)
√
4 (TM˜saφ : c1)√
2 (FM˜ra(M˜saφ) : c1)
√
3 (FM˜saφ : c2r)
(Fφ : c3s)
(Tφ : c3s)
×
[C ]
c1 ' c1
c1 Pa c2r
c2r Pa c3s
Fig. 9. Tableau for M˜saφ→ M˜ra(M˜saφ)
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5.3 Soundness of the calculus
We start by proving the soundness property of the tableaux calculus. The proof is similar
to the soundness proof developed for BI tableaux and some recent extensions [13,14,17,
21]. We remind here the key notions and more detailed proofs are given in Appendix A.
The main point is the notion of realizability of a CSS 〈F ,C 〉, meaning that there
exists a model M and an embedding (|.|) from the resource labels to the resource set of
M such that if (Tφ : x) ∈ F , then |x| M φ ,and if (Fφ : x) ∈ F , then |x| 6M φ.
Definition 10 (Realization). Let 〈F ,C 〉 be a CSS. A realization of it is a pair (M , |.|)
where M = (R ,{∼a}a∈A,V ) is a model and |.| :Dr(C )→ R such that
– for any r ∈ Res, we have |λ(r)|= r,
– |ε|= e,
– |.| is a total function (for all x ∈Dr(C ), |x| is defined),
– if xy ∈Dr(C ), then |x| • |y| ↓ and |x| • |y|= |xy|,
– if (Tφ : x) ∈ F , then |x| |=M φ,
– if (Fφ : x) ∈ F , then |x| 6|=M φ,
– if x' y ∈ C , then |x|= |y|, and
– if xPu y ∈ C , then |x| ∼u |y|.
We say that a CSS is realizable if there exists a realization of this CSS. We say that
a tableau is realizable if at least one of its branches is realizable.
Proposition 7. Let 〈F ,C 〉 be a CSS and R = (M , |.|) be a realization of it. R is also
a realization of 〈F ,C 〉, and then
1. for all x ∈Dr(C ), |x| is defined,
2. if x' y ∈ C , then |x|= |y|, and
3. if xPu y ∈ C , then |x| ∼u |y|.
Lemma 3. The rules of the tableaux method for ERL preserve realizability
Proof. By induction on the structure of realizable tableaux. See [15] for a similar argu-
ment and Appendix A for more details.
Lemma 4. Closed branches are not realizable.
Proof. By a case analysis of closed branches that are realizable. See [15] for a similar
argument and Appendix A for more details.
Theorem 1 (Soundness). Let φ be a formula of ERL. If there exists a tableaux proof
for φ, then φ is valid.
Proof. We suppose that there exists a proof for φ. Then there is a closed tableau Tφ
for the CSS C = 〈{(Fφ : c1)},{c1 ' c1}〉. Now suppose that φ is not valid. Then there
is a countermodel M = (R ,{∼a}a∈A,V ) and a resource r ∈ R such that r 6|=M φ. Let
R= (M , |.|) such that |c1|= r. AsR is a realization of C, by Lemma 3, Tφ is realizable.
Moreover by Lemma 4, Tφ cannot be closed, which is absurd because Tφ is a proof and
then is closed by definition. Therefore φ is valid.
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5.4 Countermodel generation and Completeness of the calculus
Before proceeding to establish completeness, we consider a countermodel extraction
method for our calculus that is adapted from a method proposed in [27].
Countermodel generation. The method transforms the sets of resource and agent con-
straints of a branch 〈F ,C 〉 into a model M such that, if (Tφ : x) ∈ F , then ρx M φ
and, if (Fφ : x) ∈ F , then ρx 6M φ, where ρx is the representative of the equivalence
class of x.
The method is based mainly on the definition on a particular CSS 〈F ,C 〉, called
a Hintikka CSS. For more details, see Appendix B. This approach for countermodel
extraction is proposed and illustrated for other bunched logics in [13–15,17,21] and
adapted to our ERL logic.
Example. We give an example of countermodel extraction by considering A = {a} and
Res = {e,r} and the formula Lsaφ→ LraLsaφ, which is not valid. By applications of the
tableaux rules, we obtain the tableau of Fig 10.
[F ]
√
1 (FLsaφ→ Lsa(Lraφ) : c1)
√
4 (TLsaφ : c1)√
2 (FLsa(Lraφ) : c1)
√
3 (FLraφ : c2)
(Fφ : c3)
(Tφ : c2)
#
[C ]
c1 ' c1
c1sPa c2
c2r Pa c3
Fig. 10. Tableau for Lsaφ→ Lsa(Lraφ)
We see that, in step 4, we can only find c2 as suitable label for c1sPa x and thus the
tableau is not closed. The only branch of this tableau is a Hintikka CSS and we extract
this countermodel using Definition 13.
We have M = (R ,{∼a}a∈A,V ), where
– R = Rep(Dr(C ))∪Res = {e,r,s,ρc1 ,ρc2 ,ρc3 ,ρc1λ(s),ρc2λ(r)}
– The resource composition:
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• e r s ρc1 ρc2 ρc3 ρc1λ(s) ρc2λ(r).
e e r s ρc1 ρc2 ρc3 ρc1λ(s) ρc2λ(r)
r r ↑ ↑ ↑ ρc2λ(r) ↑ ↑ ↑
s s ↑ ↑ ρc1λ(s) ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
ρc1 ρc1 ↑ ρc1λ(s) ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
ρc2 ρc2 ρc2λ(r) ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
ρc3 ρc3 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
ρc1λ(s) ρc1λ(s) ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
ρc2λ(r) ρc2λ(r) ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
– The equivalence relation, reflexivity is not represented:
e
r
s
ρc1λ(s) ρc2
a
ρc2λ(r) ρc3
a
ρc1
– V (φ) = {ρc2}.
We can easily verify that we have a countermodel of Lsaφ→ Lsa(Lraφ).
1. As ρc2 ∈V (φ), we have ρc2 |= φ.
2. As {x ∈ R|ρc1 • s∼a x}= {ρc2}, we have by (1), ρc1 |=M Lsaφ.
3. As ρc3 /∈V (φ), we have ρc3 6|= φ.
4. As ρc2 • r = ρc2λ(r) ∼a ρc3 , by (3), we have ρc2 6|=M Lraφ.
5. As ρc1 • s = ρc1λ(s) ∼a ρc2 , by (4), we have ρc1 6|=M Lsa(Lraφ).
6. By (2) and (5), we conclude that ρc1 6|=M Lsaφ→ Lsa(Lraφ).
Completeness. The proof of completeness is an extension of the corresponding proof
proposed for BBI [27] to the epistemic connectives of our logic. It consists in building,
using a fair strategy, a Hintikka CSS from a formula for which there is no tableaux proof
that is a sequence of labelled formulae in which all labelled formulae occur infinitely
many times, and also an oracle that is a set of non-closed CSS with some specific
properties. Then, assuming there is no tableaux proof for φ, we build a Hintikka CSS,
and deduce from it that φ is not valid.
Theorem 2 (Completeness). Let φ be an ERL formula. If φ is valid, then there exists a
tableaux proof for φ.
Proof. The proof is an extension of the corresponding proof proposed for BBI [27] to
the epistemic connectives of our logic. More details are given in Appendix C.
To complete this section, we show how we can define a tableaux calculus for the
sublogic ERL∗ .
Definition 11 (Tableaux for ERL∗). The tableaux calculus for ERL∗ is defined exactly
as the tableaux calculus for ERL, with the addition of the following rule to Definition
6:
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xPu y yk ' yk 〈ca〉
xk Pu yk
Proposition 8. The tableaux calculus for ERL∗ is sound and complete with respect to
the semantics given in Sections 2 and 3.
Proof. The proof is the same as the one for ERL except that the new rule 〈ca〉 must
be considered each time the closure of constraints is concerned. This addition does not
cause any difficulties with proofs since this rule is a direct translation of the specific
property of ERL∗ as described in Definition 4.
6 Conclusions
We have presented a substructural epistemic logic, based on Boolean BI, in which the
epistemic modalities, which extend the usual epistemic modalities, are parametrized on
the agent’s local resource. The logic represents a first step in developing an epistemic
resource semantics. This step is illustrated through examples that explore the gap be-
tween policy and implementation in access control. We have also provided a system of
labelled tableaux for the logic, and established soundness and completeness.
Much further work is suggested. First, the theory, pragmatics, and interpretation of
the epistemic modalities with resource semantics, including aspects of local reasoning
for resource-carrying agents [25,37], concurrency [32]. Second, logical theory, includ-
ing proof systems, model-theoretic properties, and complexity. Connections with other
approaches to modelling the relationship between policy and implementation in sys-
tem management, such as those discussed in [39] and approaches involving logics for
layered graphs [1,10] should be explored.
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A Soundness: proofs of lemmas
Lemma 3. The rules of the tableaux method for ERL preserve realizability.
Proof. By induction on the structure of realizable tableaux. See [15] for a similar ar-
gument. Let T be a realizable tableau. By definition, T has a realizable branch B =
〈F ,C 〉. LetR= (M , |.|) be a realization of the branch B , whereM = (R ,{∼a}a∈A,V )
and |.| : Dr(C )→ R. If we apply a rule on a labelled formula of a branch that is not B
then B is not modified, and then T is realizable. Else, we consider each kind of formula
on which the rule is applied.
– (TI : x) ∈ F .
We have, by definition of realization, |x| |=M I. Then |x|= e. As |ε|= e then |x|= |ε|
and we remark that R is a realization of the new branch 〈F ,C ∪{x' ε}〉.
– (Tφ1 ∗φ2 : x) ∈ F .
By realization, we have |x| |=M φ1 ∗ φ2. Then, by definition, there exist r1,r2 ∈ R
such that r1 • r2 ↓, |x| = r1 • r2, r1 |=M φ1 and r2 |=M φ2. As ci and c j are new
resource label constants, |ci| and |c j| are not defined. Moreover as ci 6= c j, we can
extend R by setting |ci|= r1 and |c j|= r2. As we have |ci| • |c j| ↓ and, by implicit
extension, |x| = |ci| • |c j| = |cic j|, we obtain a realization of 〈F ,C ∪{x ' cic j}〉,
that is a realization of the branch 〈F ∪{(Tci :,)(Tφ2 : c j)},C ∪{x' cic j}〉.
– (Fφ1 ∗φ2 : x) ∈ F .
We have |x| 6|=M φ1 ∗ φ2. By definition, for all r1,r2 ∈ R such that r1 • r2 ↓ and
|x| = r1 • r2, we have r1 6|=M φ or r2 6|=M ψ. The branch is expanded into two
branches that are 〈F ∪{(Fφ : y)},C 〉 and 〈F ∪{(Fψ : z)},C 〉, where x ' yz ∈ C .
By Proposition 7, |x| = |yz|. By definition of realization, |.| is total, then |y| • |z| ↓
and |yz| = |y| • |z|. Thus |y| 6|=M φ or |z| 6|=M ψ. Therefore R is a realization of at
least one of the two new branches 〈F ∪{(Fφ : y)},C 〉 or 〈F ∪{(Fψ : z)},C 〉.
35
– (TLruφ : x) ∈ F and xλ(r)Pu y ∈ C .
We have |x| |=M Lruφ. By definition, for all r′ ∈ R such that |x| • r ∼u r′, we have
r′ |=M φ. Moreover, as xλ(r) Pu y ∈ C , by Proposition 7, we have |xλ(r)| ∼u |y|.
By definition, |xλ(r)|= |x| • |λ(r)|= |x| • r. Thus, |x| • r ∼u |y| and finally, we have
|y| |=M φ, thus R is a realization of the branch 〈F ∪{(Tφ : y)},C 〉.
– (FLruφ : x) ∈ F .
We have |x| 6|=M Lruφ. By definition, there exists r′ ∈ R such that |x| • r ∼u r′ and
r′ 6|=M φ. As ci is a new constraint, |ci| is not defined and we can choose |ci|= r′ and
we have |ci| 6|=M φ and |x| • r ∼u |ci|. By definition, |xλ(r)| = |x| • |λ(r)| = |x| • r.
Thus |xλ(r)| ∼u |ci| and we have a realization of the branch 〈F ∪{(Fφ : ci)},C ∪
{xλ(r)Pu ci}〉.
Other cases are proved similarly.
Lemma 4. Closed branches are not realizable.
Proof. By a case analysis of closed branches that are realizable. See [15] for more
details.
Let 〈F ,C 〉 a closed branch. We suppose that this branch is realizable. Let R =
(M , |.|) a realization of it. There are four cases:
– (Tφ : x) ∈ F , (Fφ : y) ∈ F and x ' y ∈ C . By Proposition 7, as the branch is
realizable, we must have |x| |=M φ, |y| 6|=M φ and |x|= |y|, which is absurd.
– (FI : x) ∈ F and x ' ε ∈ C . By Proposition 7, as the branch is realizable, we must
have |x| 6|=M I and |x|= |ε|. By Definition 3, we have e 6= |x| and by Definition 10
we have |x|= e, which is absurd.
– (F> : x)∈F . By Proposition 7, as the branch is realizable, we must have |x| 6|=M >,
which is absurd by Definition 3.
– (T⊥ : x)∈F . By Proposition 7, as the branch is realizable, we must have |x| |=M ⊥,
which is absurd by Definition 3.
As all cases are absurd, we conclude that 〈F ,C 〉 is not realizable.
B Countermodel extraction method
We propose a countermodel extraction method, first designed in [27] for BBI, that con-
sists in transforming the sets of resource and agent constraints of a branch 〈F ,C 〉 into
a model M such that if (Tφ : x) ∈ F then ρx M φ and if (Fφ : x) ∈ F then ρx 6M φ,
where ρx is the representative of the equivalence class of x. First, we define when a CSS
〈F ,C 〉 is a Hintikka CSS.
Definition 12 (Hintikka CSS). A CSS 〈F ,C 〉 is a Hintikka CSS iff, for any formula
φ,ψ ∈ L , any resource r ∈ Res, any resource label x,y,z ∈ Λr, and any agent u ∈ A:
1. (Tφ : x) /∈ F or (Fφ : y) /∈ F or x' y /∈ C
2. (FI : x) /∈ F or x' ε /∈ C
3. (F> : x) /∈ F
4. (T⊥ : x) /∈ F
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5. If (TI : x) ∈ F , then x' ε ∈ C
6. If (T¬φ : x) ∈ F , then (Fφ : x) ∈ F
7. If (F¬φ : x) ∈ F , then (Tφ : x) ∈ F
8. If (Tφ∧ψ : x) ∈ F , then (Tφ : x) ∈ F and (Tψ : x) ∈ F
9. If (Fφ∧ψ : x) ∈ F , then (Fφ : x) ∈ F or (Fψ : x) ∈ F
10. If (Tφ∨ψ : x) ∈ F , then (Tφ : x) ∈ F or (Tψ : x) ∈ F
11. If (Fφ∨ψ : x) ∈ F , then (Fφ : x) ∈ F and (Fψ : x) ∈ F
12. If (Tφ→ ψ : x) ∈ F , then (Fφ : x) ∈ F or (Tψ : x) ∈ F
13. If (Fφ→ ψ : x) ∈ F , then (Tφ : x) ∈ F and (Fψ : x) ∈ F
14. If (Tφ∗ψ : x) ∈ F , then ∃y,z ∈ Λr, x' yz ∈ C and (Tφ : y) ∈ F and (Tψ : z) ∈ F
15. If (Fφ∗ψ : x) ∈ F , then ∀y,z ∈ Λr, x' yz ∈ C implies (Fφ : y) ∈ F or (Fψ : z) ∈ F
16. If (Tφ−∗ψ : x) ∈ F , then ∀y ∈ Λr, xy ∈Dr implies (Fφ : y) ∈ F or (Tψ : xy) ∈ F
17. If (Fφ−∗ψ : x) ∈ F , then ∃y ∈ Λr, xy ∈Dr and (Tφ : y) ∈ F and (Fψ : xy) ∈ F
18. If (TLruφ : x) ∈ F , then ∀y ∈ Λr, xλ(r)Pu y ∈ C implies (Tφ : y) ∈ F
19. If (FLruφ : x) ∈ F , then ∃y ∈ Λr, xλ(r)Pu y ∈ C and (Fφ : y) ∈ F
20. If (TMruφ : x) ∈ F , then there exists y ∈ Λr, xPu yλ(r) ∈ C and (Tφ : yλ(r)) ∈ F
21. If (FMruφ : x) ∈ F , then for all y ∈ Λr, xPu yλ(r) ∈ C implies (Fφ : yλ(r)) ∈ F
22. If (TNruφ : x) ∈ F , then for all y ∈ Λr, xλ(r)Pu yλ(r) ∈ C implies (Tφ : yλ(r)) ∈ F
23. If (FNruφ : x) ∈ F , then there exists y ∈ Λr, xλ(r)Pu yλ(r) ∈ C and (Fφ : yλ(r)) ∈ F
24. If (TL˜ruφ : x) ∈ F , then there exists y ∈ Λr, xλ(r)Pu y ∈ C and (Tφ : y) ∈ F
25. If (FL˜ruφ : x) ∈ F , then for all y ∈ Λr, xλ(r)Pu y ∈ C implies (Fφ : y) ∈ F
26. If (TM˜ruφ : x) ∈ F , then ∀y ∈ Λr, xPu yλ(r) ∈ C implies (Tφ : yλ(r)) ∈ F
27. If (FM˜ruφ : x) ∈ F , then ∃y ∈ Λr, xPu yλ(r) ∈ C and (Fφ : yλ(r)) ∈ F
28. If (TN˜ruφ : x) ∈ F , then there exists y ∈ Λr, xλ(r)Pu yλ(r) ∈ C and (Tφ : yλ(r)) ∈ F
29. If (FN˜ruφ : x) ∈ F , then for all y ∈ Λr, xλ(r)Pu yλ(r) ∈ C implies (Fφ : yλ(r)) ∈ F .
Conditions 1 to 4 ensure that a Hintikka CSS is not closed and conditions 5 to 29
ensure that it is saturated (no new tableaux rule can be applied).
To extract countermodels, we must manipulate equivalence classes. The equivalence
class of x ∈ Dr(C ), denoted [x], is the set [x] = {y ∈ Λr | x ' y ∈ C}. Moreover the
function ρ that extracts a representative from a class is defined for any class [x] by
ρ([x]) = r if ∃r ∈ Res/λ(r) ∈ [x] and by ρ([x]) = y with y an arbitrary element of [x]
otherwise. We note that ρx = ρ([x]) and that Rep(Dr(C )), the set of all representatives
of Dr(C ), is given by Rep(Dr(C )) = {ρx | x ∈Dr(C )}.
Lemma 5. For any set of constraints C , we have e ∈ Rep(Dr(C )) and ρε = e.
Definition 13 (Function Ω). Let 〈F ,C 〉 be a Hintikka CSS. The function Ω associates
to 〈F ,C 〉 a 3-tuple Ω(〈F ,C 〉) = (R ,{∼a}a∈A,V ), where R = (R,•), such that
– R = Rep(Dr(C ))∪ Res,
– if α /∈ Rep(Dr(C )) or β /∈ Rep(Dr(C )), then α•β=↑, else, α= ρx and β= ρy, and
we have
ρx •ρy =
{↑ if xy 6∈Dr(C )
ρxy otherwise,
– for all a ∈ A, α∼a β iff α= ρx and β= ρy and xPa y ∈ C , and
– α ∈V (p) iff α= ρx and there exists y ∈ Λr such that y' x ∈ C and (Tp : y) ∈ F .
37
Lemma 6. Let 〈F ,C 〉 be a Hintikka CSS. Ω(〈F ,C 〉) is a model.
Lemma 7. Let 〈F ,C 〉 be a Hintikka CSS and M = Ω(〈F ,C 〉) = (R ,{∼a}a∈A,V ),
where R = (R,•). For any formula φ ∈ L , any agent a ∈ A and any x,y ∈ Dr(C ), we
have: (1) If (Fφ : x) ∈ F , then ρx 6|=M φ; (2) If (Tφ : x) ∈ F , then ρx |=M φ.
Lemma 8. Let 〈F ,C 〉 be a Hintikka CSS such that (Fφ : x) ∈ F . The formula φ is not
valid and Ω(〈F ,C 〉) is a countermodel of φ.
Proof. Let 〈F ,C 〉 be a Hintikka CSS such that (Fφ : x) ∈ F . Let K = Ω(〈F ,C 〉). By
Lemma 6,K is a model. As 〈F ,C 〉 is a CSS, then by (Pcss) and Corollary 2, x∈Dr(C ).
Thus, by Lemma 7, we have ρx 6|=M φ. Therefore, K is a countermodel of the formula
φ and we can conclude that φ is not valid.
C Proof of completeness
This proof is an extension of the proof for BBI [27] to the epistemic connectives of our
logic. It consists in identifying two things. First, a Hintikka CSS, using a fair strategy,
from a formula for which there is no tableaux proof; that is, a sequence of labelled
formulae in which all labelled formulae occur infinitely many times. Second, an oracle;
that is, a set of non-closed CSSs with some specific properties.
Definition 14 (Fair strategy). A fair strategy is a sequence of labelled formulae and
agent constraints (Si)i∈N in ({T,F}×L ×Λr)∪ (Λr ×A×Λr) such that all labelled
formulae and all agent constraints occur infinitely many times in this sequence; that is,
{i ∈ N | Si ≡ (SF : x)} and {i ∈ N | Si ≡ xλ(r) Pu y} are infinite, for any (SF : x) ∈
{T,F}×L×Λr and any xλ(r)Pu y ∈ Λr×A×Λr.
Proposition 9. There exists a fair strategy.
Proof. Let X = ({T,F}×L ×Λr)∪ (Λr ×A×Λr). As Prop is countable then L is
countable. Moreover, Λr is countable (remember that γr is countable). Therefore, X is
countable. So N×X is countable and there exists a surjective function ϕ :N−→N×X .
Let p : N×X −→ X defined by p(i,x) = x and u = p ◦ ϕ. We show that u is a fair
strategy by showing that for any x ∈ X , u−1({x}) is infinite. Let x ∈ X . u−1({x}) =
ϕ−1(p−1({x})). But p−1({x}) = {(i,x)|i ∈ N} so p−1(x) is infinite. As ϕ is surjective
ϕ−1(p−1({x})) is also infinite.
Definition 15. Let℘be a set of CSS.
1. ℘ is 4-closed if 〈F ,C 〉 ∈℘ holds whenever 〈F ,C 〉 4 〈F ′,C ′〉 and 〈F ′,C ′〉 ∈℘
holds.
2. ℘ is of finite character if 〈F ,C 〉 ∈℘holds whenever 〈F f ,C f 〉 ∈℘holds for every
〈F f ,C f 〉4 f 〈F ,C 〉.
3. ℘ is saturated if, for any 〈F ,C 〉 ∈℘and any instance
cond(F ,C )
〈F1,C1〉 | . . . | 〈Fk,Ck〉
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of a rule of Figure 8, if cond(F ,C ) is fulfilled, then 〈F ∪Fi,C ∪Ci〉 ∈℘for at least
one i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}.
Definition 16 (Oracle). An oracle is a set of non-closed CSSs that is4-closed, of finite
character, and saturated.
Lemma 9. There exists an oracle which contains every finite CSS for which there exists
no closed tableau.
Proof. The proof is an adaptation for our epistemic modalities of the corresponding
proof schema in [13,27]. The proof given in [13] provides the necessary notions to
develop this proof in detail.
To prove completeness, we consider a formula ϕ for which there exists no proof and
we show that there exists a countermodel for this formula.
The proof depends on finding a way to obtain a Hintikka CSS. By Lemma 9, there
exists an oracle which contains every finite CSS for which there exists no closed tableau.
We denote by℘ this oracle. By Proposition 9, there exists a fair strategy. We denote by
S this strategy and Si the ith formula or agent constraint of S . As T0 can not be closed
then its unique branch belongs to the oracle, that is 〈{(Fϕ : c1)},{c1 ' c1}〉 ∈℘.
We build a sequence 〈Fi,Ci〉i>0 whose limit is a Hintikka CSS, as follows:
– 〈F0,C0〉= 〈{(Fϕ : c1)},{c1 ' c1}〉;
– Si is a labelled formula of the form (SF : x):
- If 〈Fi∪{(SF : x)},Ci〉 6∈℘, then 〈Fi+1,Ci+1〉= 〈Fi,Ci〉;
- If 〈Fi∪{(SF : x)},Ci〉 ∈℘, then 〈Fi+1,Ci+1〉= 〈Fi∪{(SF : x)}∪Fe,Ci∪Ce〉
such that Fe and Ce are given by
Si Fi Fe Ce
T I /0 {x' ε}
T φ∗ψ {(Tφ : a),(Tψ : b)} {x' ab}
F φ−∗ψ {(Tφ : a),(Fψ : xa)} {xa' xa}
F Lruφ {(Fφ : a)} {xλ(r)Pu a}
T Mruφ {(Tφ : aλ(r))} {xPu aλ(r)}
F Nruφ {(Fφ : aλ(r))} {xλ(r)Pu aλ(r)}
T L˜ruφ {(Tφ : a)} {xλ(r)Pu a}
F M˜ruφ {(Fφ : aλ(r))} {xPu aλ(r)}
T N˜ruφ {(Tφ : aλ(r))} {xλ(r)Pu aλ(r)}
Otherwise /0 /0
with a= c2i+2 and b= c2i+3.
– Si is an agent constraint of the form xλ(r)Pu y:
- If γr ∩ (E(x)∪E(y)) 6⊆ {c1, ...,c2i+1}, then 〈Fi+1,Ci+1〉= 〈Fi,Ci〉;
- If 〈Fi,Ci∪{xλ(r),Pu y}〉 6∈℘ then 〈Fi+1,Ci+1〉= 〈Fi,Ci〉;
- If 〈Fi,Ci∪{xλ(r)Pu y}〉 ∈℘, then 〈Fi+1,Ci+1〉= 〈Fi,Ci∪{xλ(r)Pu y}〉.
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Proposition 10. For any i ∈ N, the following properties hold:
1. (Fϕ : c1) ∈ Fi and c1 ' c1 ∈ Ci;
2. Fi ⊆ Fi+1 and Ci ⊆ Ci+1;
3. 〈Fi,Ci〉i>0 ∈℘;
4. Ar(Ci)⊆ {c1,c2, . . . ,c2i+1}.
The limit CSS 〈F∞,C∞〉 of 〈Fi,Ci〉i>0 is defined by F∞ =⋃i>0Fi, C∞ =⋃i>0Ci.
Proposition 11. The following properties hold:
1. 〈F∞,C∞〉 ∈℘;
2. For any labelled formula (Sφ : x), if 〈F∞∪{(Sφ : x)},C∞〉 ∈℘, then (Sφ : x) ∈ F∞;
3. For any agent constraint xλ(r)Pu y, if 〈F∞,C∞∪{xλ(r)Pu y}〉 ∈℘, then xλ(r)Pu
y ∈ C∞.
Lemma 10. The limit CSS is an Hintikka CSS.
Proof. By Proposition 11, 〈F∞,C∞〉 ∈℘. We must verify that all conditions of Defini-
tion 12 hold.
Theorem 3 (Completeness). Let ϕ be a formula. If ϕ is valid, then there exists a proof
for ϕ.
Proof. Similar to the proof of the corresponding result in [15]. We suppose that there is
no proof for the formula ϕ and show that ϕ is not valid. The method which we present
here allows us to build a limit CSS 〈F∞,C∞〉 that, by Lemma 10, is a Hintikka CSS. By
property 1 of Proposition 10, (Fϕ : c1) ∈ Fi, for any i > 0. By the definition of a limit
CSS, (Fϕ : c1) ∈ F∞. By Lemma 8, ϕ is not valid.
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